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END OF THE BEGINNING OR BEGINNING OF
THE END? SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY’S STALLED
SECURITY AGENDA AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR RESTARTING IT
Stephen M. Maurer*
Last year, synthetic biology celebrated its tenth
anniversary by creating a bacterium around an artificial
genome. But a second milestone may have been just as
important. Over the years, synthetic biologists have devoted
enormous effort to identifying security risks and debating
solutions. At the same time, they knew that any debate would
be pointless unless it ended in practical action. In the end,
members pursued two strategies. The first was traditional and
asked government to write regulations. The second asked
industry and academics to govern themselves. Prior to 2009–
2010, there was no way to know whether either strategy would
produce useful results. Optimists and pessimists could see
what they wanted.
Today, we know much more, and the news is
discouraging. Almost everyone agrees that the security
agenda’s first and most urgent task is to keep would-be
terrorists from buying synthetic DNA. But just how hard
should companies investigate customer orders before filling
them? Mainstream security experts have long agreed that
many threats do not appear on any list, let alone the U.S.
government's list of officially regulated “Select Agents.” For
the foreseeable future, the only way to detect these threats is
for human experts to compare each customer request against
similar published sequences that have well-known biological
functions. In November 2009, gene companies around the
world announced that they would indeed pay human experts
to do this. One might have expected the U.S. government to
endorse this result. Instead, the Department of Health and
Human Services (“HHS”) announced draft guidelines that
encouraged companies to adopt a weaker procedure (“Best
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Match”) that can only detect sequences derived from Select
Agents. The guidelines became final in October of 2010.
Surely, this is a modest return for ten years of effort.
Worse, it signals that the U.S. government will shelter
industry from strong biosecurity standards even when
industry has already agreed to them. If so, synthetic biology’s
security agenda has been so much wasted effort. Clearly, it is
time for a closer look. This Article examines what synthetic
biologists have done to improve biosecurity over the past
decade and asks how much additional progress can be
expected. Parts I through III introduce synthetic biology, the
economic and scientific forces that have driven it for the past
decade, and the pressures that persuaded the community and
eventually the U.S. government to promise improved
biosecurity. The Article then turns to the familiar argument
that attempts to regulate technology are hopeless. To the
contrary, Part IV argues that many of the weapons of mass
destruction (“WMD”) technologies developed over the last
century were eminently predictable and could have been
blocked by policymakers. Part V reviews synthetic biologists’
extended debate over when and how to control so-called
“experiments of concern” that might lead to new and better
weapons. Parts VI and VII review synthetic biologists’
parallel debate over how to deny the field’s existing
technologies, including synthetic DNA, to terrorists. Part
VIII reviews the community’s failed attempt to implement
these ideas through a combination of self-governance and
formal government regulation. Part IX looks at the prospects
for additional private standards and government regulation in
the foreseeable future. Part X identifies practical reforms that
would allow synthetic biology to revive its stalled security
agenda. Part XI provides a brief conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION: SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AT THE CROSSROADS
“Synthetic biology,” like most phrases beloved of funding agencies,
is an elastic term. That said, it is almost always used to describe
experiments that can only be done with artificial DNA or at the very
least would not otherwise be affordable. According to this definition,
synthetic biology has existed as a distinct discipline since approximately
the year 2000.1 This dating is particularly satisfying because it makes the
This date is inevitably arbitrary. Nevertheless, it would be hard to argue that the field
existed much before the first gene synthesis companies began operations in 1999. Stephen
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field’s tenth anniversary coincide with J. Craig Venter and associates’
announcement that they had created a cell entirely controlled by artificial
DNA.2 However, 2010 also marked a second anniversary. Since 9/11
and the Washington anthrax attacks, synthetic biologists have devoted
enormous energy to identifying security threats and debating policy
responses. These activities were only meaningful if government or the
community was willing to implement them. This, however, could only
be judged on the basis of concrete results, and for most of synthetic
biology’s first decade there were none.
Today we know much more, and the news is discouraging.
Synthetic biology’s security priorities have almost always included
denying synthetic DNA to terrorists. But just how hard should genemakers examine customer orders before filling them? Academic
synthetic biologists called on industry to implement meaningful
screening programs as early as 2006. In April 2008, a European trade
association, the International Association Synthetic Biology (“IASB”),
began developing a private standard that required human experts to
examine incoming customer orders for threats.
But there was
opposition. Indeed, two large gene-makers tried to derail IASB’s
standard at the last minute by promoting what they called a “fast” and
“cheap” alternative that would have replaced human experts with
computers. This led to a dramatic, Silicon Valley-style standards war
over biosecurity. Like most such wars, the market delivered its
judgment decisively. By November 2009, more than eighty percent of
the industry’s installed capacity—including the same companies that
had previously agitated for fast and cheap solutions—had adopted the
IASB Code or an equivalent standard. Furthermore, IASB’s Code had
spread across the world to include companies in Europe, the United
States, and even China.3
M. Maurer et al., Making Commercial Biology Safer: What the Gene Synthesis Industry
Has Learned About Screening Customers and Orders (Sept. 17, 2009) (unpublished
working paper), available at http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/Maurer_IASB_Screening.pdf.
Conversely, the field was clearly self-aware by the time that Professor Bustamonte coined,
or at least independently reinvented, the phrase “synthetic biology” in 2001. Luis Campos,
That Was the Synthetic Biology That Was, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: THE TECHNOSCIENCE AND
ITS SOCIETAL CONSEQUENCE 5 (Markus Schmidt et al. eds. 2009); see also Rob Carlson,
Synthetic Biology 2.0, Part IV: What’s in a Name?, SYNTHESIS (May 23, 2006, 11:50 PM),
http://www.synthesis.cc/2006/05/synthetic-biology-20-part-iv-whats-in-a-name.html.
Both considerations suggest that it is reasonable to date the field from 2000.
2
See Daniel G. Gibson et al., Creation of a Bacterial Cell Controlled by a Chemically
Synthesized Genome, 329 SCI. 52 (2010) (reporting the design, synthesis, and assembly of the
Mycoplasma mycoides genome at the Venter Institute).
3
See infra Part VIII.B (discussing industry standards, including IASB’s Code of
Conduct).
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So far so good, but the U.S. federal government was also developing
its own screening standard. Observers, including the editors of the
prestigious science journal Nature, universally assumed that government
regulation would inevitably be stronger than any private standard. They
were wrong. Instead, HHS overruled the market by announcing nonbinding guidelines that encouraged companies to use fast and cheap
solutions after all. Despite criticism, HHS finalized the document—
albeit in slightly watered-down form—in October 2010.4 It is not yet
clear whether industry will take the hint and retreat from its
commitment to human screening.5
Anyone who claims to take biosecurity seriously—and many
scholars do6—should be thoroughly alarmed by this result. Following
ten years of debate, the federal government has announced a policy that
requires companies to spend almost nothing on screening. Worse, the
government has overruled a significantly higher private standard to
reach this result. This strongly suggests that the U.S. government is
more allergic to regulation than industry itself. Were synthetic biology’s
security discussions a charade from the beginning? And what, if
anything, should we expect in the future?
Clearly, it is time to take stock. This Article reviews synthetic
biology’s decade-long quest to invent and implement meaningful
security measures and asks what, if anything, can be done to re-start its
agenda. Part II provides a short history of synthetic biology and the
economic forces that have driven it for the past decade. Part III discusses
the various pressures that persuaded synthetic biologists and
government regulators to promise improved biosecurity after 9/11. Part
IV addresses and rejects the familiar argument that science is so
unpredictable that any attempt to regulate synthetic biology is a fool’s
errand. Parts V through VIII review synthetic biologists’ decade-long
debate over security. Subtopics include proposals for managing socalled “experiments of concern” that could make biological weapons
more powerful and easier to make (Part V), the debate over ideas for

Screening Framework Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA, 75
Fed. Reg. 62,820 (Oct. 13, 2010).
5
See supra Part VIII.C–D (discussing government regulation of screening).
6
There is now extensive scholarly literature arguing that genetically engineered
weapons pose realistic threats to American society. See, e.g., George W. Rutherford &
Stephen M. Maurer, The New Bioweapons: Infectious and Engineered Diseases, in WMD
TERRORISM: SCIENCE AND POLICY CHOICES 111, 128–38 (Stephen M. Maurer ed. 2009). By
comparison, skeptics have been few and far between. For a rare counterexample, see
MILTON LEITENBERG, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. STRATEGIC STUDIES INST., ASSESSING THE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND BIOTERRORISM THREAT (2005) (suggesting that terrorists’ ability
to create genetically engineered weapons has been overstated).
4
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keeping synthetic biology’s existing capabilities, especially synthetic
DNA, away from terrorists (Parts VI and VII), and the ultimately
disappointing efforts of academic scientists, industry executives, and
government regulators to turn these ideas into concrete action (Part VIII).
Part IX reviews the prospects for further action at the start of synthetic
biology’s second decade. Part X asks what synthetic biologists, many of
whom care deeply about security, can do to accelerate reform. Finally,
Part XI provides a brief conclusion.
II. A SHORT HISTORY OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
Scientists may soon look back on the genetic engineering of the 1990s
with the same nostalgia that most of us reserve for wood-and-canvas
biplanes. Just fifteen years ago, genetic engineering meant cutting and
pasting DNA from different organisms. This limited engineers to
whatever organisms existed in nature, or more precisely, whatever
organisms they could get their hands on.
Help was on the way. Academic scientists had been learning how to
create synthetic DNA molecules encoding arbitrary gene sequences since
the 1970s.7 For many years, their progress was so slow that gene-length
artificial DNA remained a curiosity. At the same time, each year saw a
little more automation and affordability. By century’s end, prices had
fallen to about five dollars per base pair.8 This turned out to be a tipping
point. Soon, scientists realized that they could perform some complex
experiments more cheaply by replacing traditional cloning methods with
synthetic DNA. This in turn created a virtuous cycle. Companies could
now specialize in producing bulk DNA and invest the profits in better
production processes. This led to even lower prices, more demand, and
still more investment. A decade later, this process is only now reaching
its technological limits. In the meantime, DNA prices have fallen by an
order of magnitude and are hovering at roughly fifty cents per base
pair.9
Cheap commercial DNA opened the door to large numbers of
previously unaffordable experiments. Increasingly, these experiments
were qualitatively different from what had come before. Suddenly,
scientists could use synthetic DNA to write arbitrary DNA sequences
Har G. Khorana, Total Synthesis of a Gene, 203 SCI. 614 (1979).
See generally Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 1−5 (discussing the falling synthetic DNA
prices). DNA’s famous double helix consists of two strands linked together by molecules
called “base pairs.” Living things use the order in which different base pairs follow each
other to encode genetic information. Synthetic genes typically include thousands or tens of
thousands of base pairs.
9
Id.
7
8
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that had never existed in nature. But why should those DNA
“blueprints” actually work? Here, researchers took a page from
engineering by identifying short, well-behaved snippets of DNA
(“standard biological parts”) that could be mixed and matched to make
more complicated designs. This was more or less the same strategy that
inventors had used to manage complex design problems since Samuel
Colt opened his firearms business in the 1830s.10 Still, there were no
guarantees. In particular, nobody knew how much new DNA could be
packed into an organism without killing it. In 2004, University of
California, Berkeley Professor Jay Keasling’s Amyris Corporation
persuaded the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation to invest forty-two
million dollars in designing an organism that could make a molecule
used in malaria drugs.11 Despite its complexity, Keasling’s design
succeeded admirably. This persuaded the National Institutes of Health
(“NIH”) and venture capitalists to invest even more in the new
technology and produced a second virtuous cycle, this time in funding.
This is where things stood in May 2010 when the J. Craig Venter
Institute (“JCVI”) announced that it had created an entire artificial
genome and used it to control a living, self-replicating bacterium.12
Some dismiss this announcement as an essentially arbitrary Edmund
Hillary (“Because it’s there”) moment. In this view, JCVI’s feat lay, at
most, in making a DNA molecule that was longer and had fewer errors
than any previous experiment.13 But commentators who argued that

10
Samuel Colt famously introduced standard parts to American industry. On the use of
standard biological parts to control complexity, see Jason R. Kelly et al., Measuring the
Activity of BioBrick Promoters Using an In Vivo Reference Standard, J. BIOMEDICAL
ENGINEERING, March 2009, http://www.jbioleng.org/content/pdf/1754-1611-3-4.pdf.
11
Randall Osborne, Amyris Gets $12 Million to Help in Bill Gates’ Malaria Effort,
BIOWORLD (Dec. 14, 2004), http://www.bioworld.com/servlet/com.accumedia.web.
Dispatcher?next=bioWorldHeadlines_article&forceid=34262.
12
Press Release, J. Craig Venter Inst., First Self-Replicating Synthetic Bacterial Cell (May,
20,
2010),
http://www.jcvi.org/cms/press/press-releases/full-text/article/first-selfreplicating-synthetic-bacterial-cell-constructed-by-j-craig-venter-institute-researcher/.
13
Professors Cho and Relman emphasize that the creation of an entire bacterial genome,
though “noteworthy,” reflects “incremental” past advances and is “primarily a matter of
scale.” Mildred K. Cho & David A. Relman, Synthetic “Life,” Ethics, National Security and
Public Discourse, 329 SCI. 38, 38 (2010). Similarly, the Presidential Commission for the Study
of Bioethical Issues has emphasized that
[t]he [JCVI] announcement last May, although extraordinary in many
ways, does not amount to creating life as either a scientific or a moral
matter. The scientific evidence before the Commission showed that
the research relied on an existing natural host . . . . [and] does not
represent the creation of life from inorganic chemicals alone.
PRESIDENTIAL COMM’N FOR THE STUDY OF BIOETHICAL ISSUES, NEW DIRECTIONS: THE ETHICS
OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 3 (2010) [hereinafter 2010
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JCVI’s Mycoplasma mycoides was a straight copy of nature’s design may
have missed the point. This is because the same techniques can now be
used to create special “chassis organisms” with deliberately small
genomes that leave maximal room for standard biological parts. If so,
we may be on the brink of synthetic biology’s third virtuous cycle.
Today, synthetic biologists insert standard parts into many different
organisms. This makes it hard for them to share data and, in particular,
to know when a design’s failure is caused by the host. The rise of chassis
organisms, on the other hand, will encourage researchers to converge on
a relatively small number of shared organisms. Microbiologists have
known since the 1950s that research communities built around “model
organisms” find it easier to share data and are much more productive.14
JCVI’s achievement promises to similarly accelerate synthetic biology.
It is hard not to see these advances as good news. At the same time,
science is neither moral nor immoral. State programs have perverted
classical biology to develop weapons since the 1940s.15 More recently,
Soviet scientists worked hard to develop genetically engineered weapons
in the 1970s and 1980s16 Given this history, it was only natural to worry
that synthetic biology methods would also be abused.
The simplest threat was economic: the Soviet program had cost far
more than any terrorist could afford. Synthetic DNA made many of
these experiments cheaper than they were before. More ambitiously,
synthetic biology meant that researchers were no longer limited to
pathogens they already possessed or could borrow from colleagues.
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.bioethics.gov/documents/syntheticbiology/PCSBI-Synthetic-Biology-Report-12.16.10.pdf.
14
Joachim Henkel & Stephen M. Maurer, Network Effects in Biology R&D, 100 AM. ECON.
REV. 159, 159 (2010).
15
The United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, and Japan all conducted large-scale
biological weapons programs during World War II. Except for Japan, most of these
programs continued into the 1960s. Uniquely, the Soviet Union continued to pursue
biological weapons into the 1990s. Unlike earlier Western programs, this work fully
exploited the then-new science of genetic engineering. See, e.g., DEADLY CULTURES:
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS SINCE 1945 (Mark Wheelis, Lajos Rózsa & Malcolm Dando eds.,
2006) (discussing the various use of biological weapons programs throughout the world);
JEANNE GUILLEMIN, BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS: FROM THE INVENTION OF STATE-SPONSORED
PROGRAMS TO CONTEMPORARY BIOTERRORISM (2005) (examining biological weapon use in
the United States, United Kingdom, Japan, and Soviet Union).
16
For the classic account, see KEN ALIBEK & STEPHEN HANDELMAN, BIOHAZARD: THE
CHILLING TRUE STORY OF THE LARGEST COVERT BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS PROGRAM IN THE
WORLD—TOLD FROM THE INSIDE BY THE MAN WHO RAN IT (1999). Some American
scientists have expressed quiet skepticism about Alibek’s claims. See, e.g., Richard W.
Titball, An Elusive Serial Killer, 430 NATURE 145, 145 (2004) (pointing out the skepticism of
American scientists interviewed for Wendy Orent’s 2004 book entitled Plague: The
Mysterious Past and Terrifying Future of the World’s Most Dangerous Disease). In fairness,
Alibek himself admits that his most spectacular claims are based on inference.
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Instead, workers who wanted particular viruses (and eventually
bacteria) could build them from scratch. And this included really
dangerous organisms—most notably, smallpox—that only exist in
heavily guarded government laboratories. Indeed, researchers had
already resurrected two viruses—1918 influenza and polio—that were
formerly extinct.17 Could smallpox be far behind? Finally, synthetic
biology promised to make machine-like organisms unlike anything
found in nature. At least in principle, could similar technologies be used
to make so-called “advanced weapons” that targeted, say, certain ethnic
groups while ignoring others?18
III. THE PRESSURE BUILDS
Synthetic biologists have always known that their technology poses
security risks. Indeed, biologists have debated claims that genetic
engineering could create epidemics since the mid-1970s.19 These
concerns happened to be particularly prominent at the time synthetic
biology was born. In 1998, Richard Preston published The Cobra Event,20
a novel in which terrorists used genetic engineering to create a supervirus. Many readers—including then-President Bill Clinton21—found
the book chillingly credible, especially because Preston had written
extensively about real-life biological weapons. The following year,
defector Ken Alibek wrote an even bigger best-seller claiming that the
Russian military had created genetically engineered weapons unlike
anything found in nature.22 These bestsellers were followed by a
renewed scholarly interest in so-called advanced weapons.23 News that

See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
For a survey of possibilities, see Rutherford & Maurer, supra note 6.
19
SUSAN WRIGHT, MOLECULAR POLITICS:
DEVELOPING AMERICAN AND BRITISH
REGULATORY POLICY FOR GENETIC ENGINEERING, 1972–82 passim (1994).
20
RICHARD PRESTON, THE COBRA EVENT (1997).
21
Margo Nash, Where Terrorism Meets Optimism, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 2002,
www.nytimes.com/2002/11/24/nyregion/in-person-where-terrorism-meets-optimism.
html (reporting that President Clinton “asked the F.B.I. to determine whether the events
described in ‘The Cobra Event’ could really happen”).
22
See ALIBEK & HANDELMAN, supra note 16.
23
See, e.g., Steven M. Block, Living Nightmares: Biological Threats Enabled by Molecular
Biology, in THE NEW TERROR: FACING THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS
39–75 (Sidney D. Drell et al. eds. 1999); RICHARD A. FALKENRATH ET AL., AMERICA’S
ACHILLES’ HEEL: NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL TERRORISM AND COVERT ATTACK
(4th prtg. 2001).
17
18
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an Australian team had discovered a way to help pox viruses evade
vaccines added to these concerns in the months before 9/11.24
Given this background, it was natural for synthetic biologists to ask
whether their field posed any special concerns. Indeed, one group
discussed the fact that their laboratory could now synthesize, though not
assemble, pox virus DNA as early as 1999. Despite this, no very detailed
or practical discussions seem to have taken place until 2002−2003.25
By then, a great deal had changed. First and foremost was 9/11 and
the Amerithrax attacks that followed two months later. Suddenly, many
officials, including the President, believed that a biological weapons
attack was imminent or even underway.26 This crisis atmosphere
predictably led to various Executive Branch responses. These ranged
from pressing researchers to suppress certain experimental results27 to
opening new dialogues with academic scientists. By 2002−2003, a wide
variety of biosecurity experts including governmental staff and advisors
were asking synthetic biologists to identify security threats and think
about possible solutions.28 Meanwhile, Congress passed the USA
PATRIOT Act, which inter alia made it a crime to possess biological
agents, toxins, or delivery systems.29 Subsequently, the Agricultural
Bioterrorism Protection Act of 2002 required people possessing Select
Agent organisms30 to undergo background checks and register with
24
Ronald J. Jackson et al., Expression of Mouse Interleukin-4 by a Recombinant Ectromelia
Virus Suppresses Cytolytic Lymphocyte Response and Overcomes Genetic Resistance to Mousepox,
75 J. VIROLOGY 1205 (2001).
25
E-mail from Drew Endy to author (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:01 PST) [hereinafter Endy E-mail]
(on file with author); accord Robert F. Service, Synthetic Biologists Debate Policing Themselves,
312 SCI. 1116, 1116 (2006) (stating that synthetic biologists started to consult ethicists and
launch studies in 2004).
26
See, e.g., GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 152–53 (2010) (recounting post-9/11 fears
that the White House had been contaminated with botulinum toxin).
27
See infra Part V.A.
28
E-mail from Robert Carlson, Principal, Biodesic to author (Mar. 1, 2011, 11:07 PST)
[hereinafter Carlson E-mail] (on file with author); E-mail from Andrew Ellington to author
(Mar. 1, 2011, 11:04 CST) (on file with author); Endy E-mail, supra note 25; see also Drew
Endy, Strategy for Biological Risk and Security (Oct. 2003) (unpublished working paper),
available at http://dspace.mit.edu/handle/1721.1/30595.
29
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 817, 115 Stat. 272, 385−86 (2001) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175
(2006)); see also Select Agents and Toxins, 42 C.F.R. pt. 73 (2010) (implementing 18 U.S.C.
§ 175 by, inter alia, publishing the list of select agents and toxins). The Act contained an
exception for “prophylactic, protective, bona fide research, or other peaceful purpose[s]”.
Pub. L. No. § 817(1)(C), 115 Stat. at 385−86 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175(b)). The bill also
made it a crime for illegal aliens and citizens of certain countries to possess, transport, or
receive organisms found on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s Select Agent
list. Id. § 817(2), 115 Stat. at 385−86 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 175b (2006)).
30
Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 7 C.F.R. pt. 331 (2010)
(implementing provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act and listing agents
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HHS.31 These laws were immediately interpreted to include DNA
molecules encoding sequences found in Select Agent organisms.
However, the application of these laws to short and/or non-identical
variant sequences remained unclear.
A. Synthetic Biology Controversies
The new laws re-focused commercial gene-makers’ attention on
security. They, in turn, introduced the issue to academic scientists.32 At
this point, an intense debate was more or less inevitable. In part, this
reflected synthetic biology’s status as a new and highly publicized
discipline. However, there were more specific reasons as well. In 2002,
Professor Eckhard Wimmer used artificial DNA to make the world’s first
artificial polio virus.33 Though widely criticized,34 Wimmer defended his
work as a deliberate wake-up call for scientists and society alike.
Thereafter, activists35 and a second incident in which researchers
resurrected the 1918 influenza virus36 kept the issue alive. In 2005, New
Scientist magazine added still more fuel to the fire by reporting that at

and toxins that “have the potential to pose a severe threat to plant health or plant
products”); Possession, Use, and Transfer of Select Agents and Toxins, 9 C.F.R. pt. 121
(2010) (implementing provisions of the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act and listing
agents and toxins that “have the potential to pose a severe threat to public health and
safety, to animal health, or to animal products”).
31
42 U.S.C. § 262a(d); see also 7 C.F.R. § 331.7 (requiring the U.S. Department of
Agriculture to develop registration and inspection measures for facilities that handle
enumerated plant and animal pathogens).
32
Endy E-mail, supra note 25; cf. Alan Pearson, Ctr. for Arms Control &
Nonproliferation:
Scientists Working Grp. on Biological & Chemical Weapons,
Establishing a Responsible Biosciences Forum 6 (Jan. 26, 2007) (unpublished report) (on file
with author) (“Similarly, a concern among DNA synthesis companies that they could be
held legally liable for even unwittingly enabling illegal activity is generating attention to
issues of misuse and responsible conduct within the synthetic biology community.”).
33
Jeronimo Cello et al., Chemical Synthesis of Poliovirus cDNA: Generation of Infectious
Virus in the Absence of Natural Template, 297 SCI. 1016, 1016−18 (2002) (describing Wimmer’s
research results).
34
John D. Steinbruner & Elisa D. Harris, Controlling Dangerous Pathogens, ISSUES SCI. &
TECH., Spring 2003, available at http://www.issues.org/19.3/steinbruner.htm. Perhaps the
highest profile criticism came from Craig Venter, who called the work “irresponsible” and
called for new procedures to review similar experiments in the future. Id. University of
Pennsylvania ethicist Arthur Caplan joined in Venter’s call for oversight. Id.
35
Activists at the Sunshine Project warned against synthetic pathogens in November
2003. Dirk Stemerding et al., Synthetic Biology and the Role of Civil Society Organizations
Shaping the Agenda and Arena of the Public Debate, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 155,
157.
36
Terrence M. Tumpey et al., Characterization of the Reconstructed 1918 Spanish Influenza
Pandemic Virus, 310 SCI. 77 (2005).
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least one gene-maker made no effort to screen incoming customer
orders.37
B. Promising Action
In the post-9/11 environment, simply identifying threats and
possible responses was no longer enough.
However tentatively,
biologists began to talk about action. The earliest and most influential
suggestion came from the National Academy of Science’s Fink
Committee.38 It urged the Bush Administration to create a new National
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (“NSABB”) to propose
regulations that the government could implement. Given post-9/11
politics, the Bush Administration could hardly refuse: it created the
NSABB in April 2004.39 This, in turn, established a clear expectation that
the NSABB—and the federal government itself—would eventually take
formal action, although how much action remained unclear.40
So far, these responses were fairly conventional. However, many
synthetic biologists see themselves as the heirs to computer science and
the electronics industry. This made it natural to ask whether selfgovernance could grow out of the community’s recurring “Synthetic
Biology” or “SB” conferences in the same way that Web self-governance
had grown out of the electronics community’s “W3C” conferences.41
37
Peter Aldhous, The Bioweapon Is in the Post, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 8. The
article reported that nine of twelve DNA makers contacted failed to examine incoming
orders on a regular basis. Id. However, this figure was somewhat misleading because only
one of the non-screeners was a gene-maker. The rest specialized in making shorter
molecules called “oligos.” Id. Screening short sequences produces large numbers of false
alarms and remains challenging even today. Id. The Guardian newspaper later published a
similar expose in which reporters purchased short segments of smallpox DNA from three
U.K. companies. James Randerson, Lax Laws, Virus DNA and Potential for Terror,
GUARDIAN, June 14, 2006, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2006/jun/14/weapons
technology.uk/print (U.K.).
38
COMM. ON RESEARCH STANDARDS & PRACTICES TO PREVENT THE DESTRUCTIVE
APPLICATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS.,
BIOTECHNOLOGY RESEARCH IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM (2004) [hereinafter FINK REPORT].
39
Kerry Boyd-Anderson, U.S. Creates Advisory Board for Biosecurity, ARMS CONTROL
ASS’N (April 2004), http://www.armscontrol.org/print/1513.
40
The Fink Committee may also have thought that the NSABB would give government
bureaucrats political cover by making strong, specific recommendations. This is, after all, a
common Beltway political tactic. See, e.g., David Wessel, Panel on Cutting Deficit Paves Way
for Politicians, WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 2011, at A4 (recounting how the Deficit Reduction
Commission was established to give Washington insiders cover to cut entitlements and
other spending). If so, they were disappointed. NSABB’s eventual recommendations were
much too vague to serve this purpose. See infra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
41
See TIM BERNERS-LEE & MARK FISCHETTI, WEAVING THE WEB: THE ORIGINAL DESIGN
AND ULTIMATE DESTINY OF THE WORLD WIDE WEB BY ITS INVENTOR (2000), for a first-hand
description of W3C and Web governance. The analogy between Web governance and
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Here, the fact that the SB1.0 conference had already hosted the
community’s first public discussion of security issues in 2004 was clearly
encouraging.42 This immediately led to expectations that the SB2.0
conference scheduled for May 2006 would take concrete actions.43
By late 2005, both the public and academic sectors had committed
themselves, however vaguely, to the principle of action.
Not
surprisingly, the first fruits were a renewed emphasis on collecting—and
if possible, building consensus around—security measures that had
already been proposed. On its face, it was naïve to think that two
hundred synthetic biologists could produce meaningful consensus, let
alone action, in the space of a three-hour meeting. On the other hand,
SB2.0’s failure to act would trigger a cycle of disappointment and low
expectations for every SB conference thereafter. In order to prevent this
outcome, the Carnegie Corporation of New York and MacArthur
Foundations funded a University of California, Berkeley project to help
community members identify and develop proposals in advance of the
meeting.44
By then, the Sloan Foundation had already funded its own $570,000,
fifteen-month program to develop options—though not formal
recommendations—for policymakers to consider.45 Because most of
these options required government regulation, the Sloan study
synthetic biology was never very exact. This was because the Web could not move
forward—indeed, could not exist—without some minimal set of standards. For this reason,
failure to adopt standards would doom the entire enterprise. By comparison, academic
and commercial synthetic biologists could continue practicing their trades with or without
biosecurity standards. This made synthetic biology’s self-governance problem much
harder than the Web’s. The extent to which synthetic biologists in academia and especially
industry managed to overcome this inertia is remarkable.
42
See Service, supra note 25, at 1116 (remarking that SB1.0 moved security issues “to the
forefront”);
Robert
Carlson,
Synthetic
Biology
1.0,
FUTUREBRIEF
(2005),
http://www.futurebrief.com/robertcarlsonbio.pdf. Carlson remarks that members were
moved both by the actual threat and by “the potential public backlash it may incite.” Id.
43
See Carlson, supra note 42 (“Synthetic Biology 2.0 is scheduled for June of 2006. We
have an enormous amount of work to do before then.”); see also George Church, Let Us Go
Forth and Safely Multiply, 438 NATURE 423, 423 (2005) (expressing confidence that SB2.0
meeting “should make significant progress” toward a code of conduct).
44
The author served as principal investigator.
45
Elizabeth Pennisi, Synthetic Biology Remakes Small Genomes, 310 SCI. 769, 770 (2005);
Craig Venter Institute Release: Major New Policy Study Will Explore Risks, Benefits of Synthetic
Genomics, BIOSPACE (June 28, 2005), http://www.biospace.com/news_story.aspx?News
EntityId=20467320. The report ultimately took twenty months and included reports from a
core group of fourteen experts. The centerpiece of the effort included three invitation-only
meetings—an ironic procedure in a project designed to build public trust—several
commissioned studies, and a final report. MICHELE GARFINKEL ET AL., SYNTHETIC
GENOMICS: OPTIONS FOR GOVERNANCE, at i (2007), available at http://www.synbiosafe.eu/
uploads/pdf/Synthetic%20Genomics%20Options%20for%20Governance.pdf.
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considered a much broader range of issues than members could address
at SB2.0. At the same time, the project would not be completed until
2007—long after SB2.0 ended. While this did not preclude community
action at SB2.0, it almost certainly made it seem less urgent.46 The main
point as of early 2006, however, was that the community had committed
itself to pursuing both private and public security initiatives. It
remained to be seen whether either track would deliver meaningful
results.
IV. IS BIOSECURITY POSSIBLE?
Anyone who listens to synthetic biologists debate security sooner or
later will hear the claim that science moves too quickly to be regulated.47
This argument surely deserves to be taken seriously. At the same time, it
is good to be suspicious. As Herman Kahn pointed out fifty years ago,
many people find the idea that a problem is hopeless strangely
comforting because it makes hard choices unnecessary.48 Clearly, there
is no way to know for certain whether synthetic biology can be
regulated. That said, it is important to try. Part IV.A addresses common
assertions that existing synthetic biology technologies are, or soon will
be, uncontrollable. Part IV.B tackles the harder question of whether
science will inevitably produce new weapons of mass destruction
(“WMD”) technologies faster than policymakers can regulate them.
A. Controlling Existing Technologies
As already discussed, the synthetic biology revolution depends on
access to cheap commercial DNA. Regulating commercial sources will
not work, however, if the same DNA can be readily obtained from other

46
The European Commission funded a €235,000 counterpart to the
Carnegie/MacArthur and Sloan projects in 2006.
Unlike the American projects,
SYNBIOSAFE was billed as a fact-finding exercise and exploration instead of a call to
action. However, it too sought to identify something like a consensus around threats and
eventual action. Huib de Vriend, Constructing Life: Early Social Reflections on the Emerging
Field of Synthetic Biology (The Hague: Rathenau Inst., Working Doc. No. 97, 2006), available
at http://depot.knaw.nl/4935/1/WED97_Constructing_Life_2006.pdf; Safety and Ethical
Aspects of Synthetic Biology, SYNBIOSAFE, http://www.synbiosafe.eu/ (last visited Apr. 10,
2011).
47
Indeed, one survey of synthetic biologists has claimed “a consensus developing
initially, according to which effective oversight of biology and protection from a
biochemical catastrophe were impossible,” so that any kind of central regulation “would be
useless.” Markus Schmidt et al., SYNBIOSAFE E-conference: Online Community Discussion
on the Societal Aspects of Synthetic Biology, 2 SYSTEMS & SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY 7, 13 (2008).
48
HERMAN KAHN, THINKING ABOUT THE UNTHINKABLE (1962).
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sources. In practice, there are at least three variants of this argument. It
is surprisingly easy to marshal evidence for each of them.
First, skeptics like to say that genes can be made by undergraduates
or even high school students.49 However, this statement is only true in
principle. In practice, even bright non-specialists make so many
mistakes that success would take many years.50
Second, some commentators argue that many academic and
corporate labs already make genes. However, this ignores the fact that
such work is almost always done for internal use or known customers.
This implies that terrorists who try to obtain DNA from these sources
will incur substantial—and often unacceptable—security risks.
Historically, terrorist plots have frequently unraveled because
companies reported unusual inquiries to authorities.51
Third, some synthetic biologists have argued that the complex skills
needed to make genes will soon be replaced by easy-to-use tabletop
synthesizers. Economically, this amounts to a bet that synthesizer
technology will eventually become competitive with specialized workers
operating in massive central facilities. No one can be sure whether this
will happen. That said, it is worth pointing out that gene synthesis
companies continue to make massive investments in plants and
equipment. This implies a market judgment that tabletop devices are not
imminent.52
In addition to the foregoing technical objections, synthetic biologists
sometimes advance various social or economic arguments that
regulation is futile. For example, many synthetic biologists argue that
even skills that are scarce—and hence regulable—today will inevitably
become ubiquitous over time. This, however, ignores history. Indeed,
some key biotech skills are markedly less common than they used to be.
During the 1990s, many universities made oligos in-house. Today,
however, most of these facilities no longer exist. Instead, researchers
find it cheaper and more convenient to buy oligos on the open market.53
This example shows that private skills can and do atrophy in the face of
Mike May, Seeking Security for Synthetic Genes, SCI. AM. WORLDVIEW,
http://www.saworldview.com/article/seeking-security-for-synthetic-genes (last visited
Apr. 10, 2011) (“You can put all the guidelines you want on industry, but if ‘Mr. Evil’ wants
to do something stupid, he can make it in a high school lab.” (quoting Claes Gustafsson,
DNA2.0’s vice president of sales and marketing)).
50
Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 3 n.10.
51
Probably the most famous is white supremacist Larry Wayne Harris’s attempt to
obtain plague from a commercial repository.
52
The fact that at least one company has tried to develop a tabletop synthesizer and
abandoned the effort as commercially impractical is also instructive. Maurer et al., supra
note 1, at 3 n.9.
53
GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45, at 4.
49
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commercial competition. The effect is likely to be particularly important
in synthetic biology, where economies of scale allow large companies to
synthesize genes much more cheaply than anyone else.
Similarly, some synthetic biologists claim that strong regulation will
breed rogue companies that specialize in defying the law.54 This model
only makes sense, however, if defying the law lets rogue companies
(a) offer lower prices than the big firms that currently dominate the
industry, or (b) make a living by selling high-priced DNA to
undesirables. In fact, neither proposition is likely. On the one hand, no
current or proposed screening standard is remotely expensive enough to
erase the big firms’ price advantage. On the other, the “undesirables”
market is tiny; the prospect of one or two terrorist orders is not nearly
enough to build a business.
Finally, some biologists, and even NSABB members,55 worry that
strong regulation could drive companies into foreign countries beyond
the reach of U.S. law. This seems doubtful. If anything, economies of
scale promise to increase the big U.S. firms’ price advantage over
competitors over time. No current or reasonably foreseeable regulation
is remotely likely to change this.
Soon after Hiroshima, Manhattan Project physicist Richard Feynman
argued that nuclear war was both imminent and inevitable. Sixty-five
years later, this prediction remains spectacularly wrong.56 It turns out

See, e.g., Rob Carlson, Tracking the Spread of Biological Technologies, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS (Nov. 21, 2008), http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/trackingthe-spread-of-biological-technologies. Carlson argues that strong regulation will breed
rogue gene-makers in the same way that the drug laws have bred illegal
methamphetamine labs. Id. The analogy is doubtful. Criminals invest enormous time and
effort learning to make methamphetamines because the illegal market is huge. By
comparison, terrorists trying to obtain smallpox would presumably submit a single order.
This is not nearly enough to support a business.
55
See, e.g., Meredith Wadman, U.S. Drafts Guidelines to Screen Genes, NATURENEWS (Dec.
4, 2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091204/full/news.2009.1117.html (“If we
deter too much, the gene-synthesis industry will go outside the US and outside our
purview, and it will come back to haunt us.” (quoting NSABB Board member Stuart Levy)).
56
Decades later, Feynman marveled at how wrong he had been:
I can’t understand it anymore, but I felt very strongly then. I sat in a
restaurant in New York, for example, and I started to look out at the
buildings, and I began to think about how much the radius of the
Hiroshima bomb damage was . . . . And I would go along and see
people building a bridge, or they would be [building] a new road and I
thought, they’re crazy, they just don’t understand. Why are they
[building] new things? It’s so useless. But, fortunately, it has been
useless for [so many] years, hasn’t it? So I’ve been wrong about it
being useless to [build] bridges and I’m glad that those other people
had the sense to go ahead.
54
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that it is not enough to know that atomic bombs are possible; difficulty
also matters. Synthetic biologists should do more than point out that it is
possible to evade regulation. They should also bear the burden of
showing that such evasions are plausibly within terrorists’ existing skill
sets. Absent this showing, we should assume that regulation will be at
least partly effective and move forward.
B. Predicting WMD Breakthroughs
Commentators often claim that science is inherently un-regulable
because (a) discoveries are frequently unexpected, and (b) policymakers
cannot control what they cannot predict. This section discusses whether
the historical record justifies this assertion. We begin by presenting short
case histories of how today’s main WMD technologies were developed.
These histories strongly suggest that policymakers could have foreseen
most, though not all, of today’s WMD threats in time to take meaningful
action.
Case 1: Atomic Weapons. The discovery of radioactive decay and,
soon after, the realization that the atomic nucleus contained enormous
power was an unexpected result of late nineteenth and early twentieth
century physics research.57 This development could not reasonably have
been foreseen or controlled by policymakers. For this reason, there was
little or nothing they could do to suppress the concept of atomic bombs.58
At the same time, no one knew how to release nuclear energy until
academic researchers unexpectedly discovered the “chain reaction”
principle, and two concrete strategies for implementing it, thirty years
later.59 Policymakers could easily have defunded the massive academic
research programs that led to this result. Once chain reactions were
discovered, however, nuclear weapons became a well-defined
engineering problem. At this point, policymakers could do little to

JAGDISH MEHRA, THE BEAT OF A DIFFERENT DRUM: THE LIFE AND SCIENCE OF RICHARD
FEYNMAN 160 (1994) (quoting Richard P. Feynman, Los Alamos from Below, ENGINEERING &
SCI., Jan./Feb. 1976, at 11, 30).
57
See ABRAHAM PAIS, INWARD BOUND: OF MATTER AND FORCES IN THE PHYSICAL WORLD
7−12 (1986) (describing nuclear research's origins in, inter alia, vacuum technology,
spectroscopy, and electromagnetism research).
58
The popular press speculated extensively about both nuclear weapons and nuclear
energy after radioactive decay was discovered in 1903. See, e.g., SPENCER R. WEART,
NUCLEAR FEAR: A HISTORY OF IMAGES 18 (1988). H.G. Wells wrote a novel exploring
atomic bombs and related arms control issues shortly before World War I. H. G. WELLS,
THE WORLD SET FREE (Hogarth Press 1988) (1914).
59
RICHARD RHODES, THE MAKING OF THE ATOMIC BOMB (1986).
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prevent some government, somewhere, from developing atomic60 and,
eventually, hydrogen weapons.61
Case 2: Radiological Weapons. The health effects of radioactivity were
discovered accidentally62 and could not have been foreseen by
policymakers. For a long time, however, radioactive isotopes were too
scarce for practical use as WMD.63 As with nuclear weapons, the turning
point came three decades later with the discovery of chain reactions. In
principle, policymakers could have defunded this research. Once
scientists invented nuclear reactors, however, there was little
policymakers could do to prevent some government, somewhere, from
developing radiological WMDs. Strangely, no government seems to
have done this. While the United States pursued radiological weapons
in the early 1950s, the program was soon abandoned so that, uniquely,
this particular form of WMD was never deployed.64
Case 3: Chemical Weapons. Policymakers were deeply concerned by
the rise of the chemical industry and its facilities for making poison gas
by the late 1890s.65 At the same time, normal industrial chemicals, such
as chlorine, had only limited toxicity. This meant that their WMD
potential was marginal. In principle, therefore, policymakers could have
usefully delayed the development of more capable weapons by signing
treaties that prevented governments from developing improved poisons.
In practice, however, such treaties would have been hard to verify and
would almost certainly have been ignored (like other weapons treaties)
once World War I began. Even so, wartime progress was limited.
Despite massive funding, government research and development

60
Some have argued that only the U.S. government was rich enough to fund atomic
weapons, and then only under the extreme conditions of World War II. This assertion is
obviously not testable.
61
Research leading to fusion weapons (the hydrogen bomb) followed a similar
trajectory. RICHARD RHODES, DARK SUN: THE MAKING OF THE HYDROGEN BOMB (1995).
62
See PAIS, supra note 57, at 93−100 (describing the tragic early history of academic and
industrial exposure to radioactivity).
63
The dirty bombs envisaged by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and others
since 9/11 would almost certainly cause very few casualties. Instead, their effects, if any,
would be mostly psychological. Many experts privately point out that dirty bombs should
not be considered WMDs at all, except somewhat sarcastically as “Weapons of Mass
Disruption.”
64
See Will Grover, All the Easy Experiments: A Berkeley Professor, Dirty Bombs, and the
Birth of Informed Consent, BERKELEY SCI. REV., Fall 2005, at 41–45 (discussing radiological
warfare research in the 1940s).
65
The first treaty against gas warfare was signed in 1899. Declaration on the Use of
Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diffusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases,
Hague Peace Conference of 1899, July 29, 1899, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
19th_century/dec99-02.asp.
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(“R&D”) programs only improved toxicity by a factor of thirty.66 This
improvement was miniscule compared to what commercial pesticide
companies, whose R&D programs were supported by large markets over
a period of decades, were able to accomplish after the War. By the mid1930s, Hitler’s Germany had exploited these discoveries to make
weapons that were 2,500 times more toxic than chlorine.67 Policymakers
could have blocked this advance by making improved pesticides illegal.
Such a ban would have immediately defunded commercial discovery
programs in a simple and above all publicly verifiable way.
Case 4: Biological Weapons—Contagious Diseases. The idea of using
contagious diseases as weapons has been known for centuries. In the
modern world, however, smallpox is almost certainly the only pathogen
capable of inflicting large-scale casualties.68 The idea that terrorists could
deliberately infect themselves to spread the disease was already widely
known at the start of the twentieth century.69 Policymakers could have
done little to stop a determined government, and perhaps terrorists,
from acquiring the pathogen and sending out human carriers to spread
the disease.70
Case 5:
Biological Weapons—Anthrax.
To work as weapons,
pathogens that do not rely on human-to-human transmission must be
able to survive for long periods on surfaces and the open air. This
property is rare: among natural agents, only anthrax spores are
simultaneously hardy and virulent enough to make useful weapons.
Policymakers could do little to suppress this knowledge, which was
widely discussed before World War II.71 Thereafter, Great Britain was
able to develop effective anthrax bombs within a year or so while the
66
The English program tested 150,000 chemicals. A similar American establishment
tested 4,000 compounds and is said to have been the largest U.S. military R&D effort prior
to the Manhattan Project. ROBERT HARRIS & JEREMY PAXMAN, A HIGHER FORM OF KILLING:
THE SECRET STORY OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE 23, 35 (1982).
67
For a detailed history of how Germany developed its Tabun and Sarin weapons, see
HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra note 66, at 55−69; and JONATHAN B. TUCKER, WAR OF NERVES:
WORLD WAR I TO AL-QAEDA 24−39 (2006). The British government similarly exploited
postwar pesticide research to achieve an additional three-fold toxicity improvement for its
VX weapon in the 1950s. HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra note 66, at 186−87; TUCKER, supra, at
158.
68
Rutherford & Maurer, supra at note 6, at 114–15.
69
See, e.g., H.G. Wells, The Stolen Bacillus, in H.G. WELLS, THE STOLEN BACILLUS AND
OTHER INCIDENTS 11 (Westholme Publishing 2005) (1895).
70
Strangely, they can do better today. The reason is that smallpox has been eradicated
and no longer exists outside of a handful of heavily guarded laboratories. This assumes, of
course, that terrorists cannot use synthetic biology to resurrect the disease.
71
The most famous use of the idea is found in Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World, which
describes what happens after Western civilization collapses under a rain of anthrax bombs.
ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (First Harper Perennial Modern Classics 2010) (1932).
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United States was well on its way to achieving large-scale production at
War’s end.72 Policymakers could have done little to stop these
developments.
Case 6:
Other Pathogens.
Anthrax apart, potential weapons
pathogens are much too delicate to survive in the open. During the
1940s, government R&D programs learned how to spread pathogens as
microscopic droplets of special protective liquids called “formulation.”
However, these wet agents were relatively ineffective. For this reason,
modern biological weapons uniformly depend on freeze-drying73
organisms into a powder. No policymaker could have anticipated that
freeze-drying would make organisms hardier when academic scientists
invented the technique in the 1890s. At least in principle, however, they
should have been able to recognize the threat after scientists discovered
that freeze-dried pathogens could be revived in 1909.74 At this point,
determined policymakers could have defunded academic efforts to scale
up the technology to the point where it could be used to make weapons.
Instead, successive researchers continued to improve the process until it
reached industrial scales in the mid-1930s.75 At this point, policymakers
could do little to stop governments from further developing the
technology. Government R&D programs duly perfected bulk freezedrying for blood plasma during World War II and extended the
technology to make biological weapons in the 1950s.76
Case 7: Genetically Engineered Threats. Biologists’ discovery that
organisms frequently exchange DNA opened the door to deliberate
genetic engineering experiments in the 1960s. No policymaker could
HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra at note 66.
I am indebted to my former research assistant, Tania Dutta, for uncovering the history
of freeze-drying.
74
See Homer F. Swift, Preservation of Stock Cultures of Bacteria by Freezing and Drying, 33 J.
EXPERIMENTAL MED. 69 (1921) (reviewing early literature on freeze-drying of bacteria and
viruses). This early work also discovered various subsidiary tricks for keeping freeze-dried
organisms alive (e.g., adding milk or sugar) that were later used by the United States and
others to manufacture biological weapons in the 1950s. Bernard W. Hammer, A Note on the
Vacuum Desiccation of Bacteria, 24 J. MED. RESEARCH 527, 527 (1911) (describing liquid
solutions containing milk sugar, milk powder, and starch).
75
Earl W. Flosdorf & Stuart Mudd, Procedure and Apparatus for Preservation in “Lyophile”
Form of Serum and Other Biological Substances, 29 J. IMMUNOLOGY 389, 392 (1935) (reporting
development of large-scale freeze-drying equipment and asserting that “[t]here is little
doubt that [freeze-drying technology] can readily be adapted to full industrial scale
operation”).
76
See R.I.N. Greves, Centrifugal Vacuum Freezing: Its Application to the Drying of Biological
Materials from the Frozen State, 153 NATURE 485, 485–87 (1944) (discussing wartime freezedrying developments and noting “great advances” in large-scale freeze-drying of blood
products during World War II); Instant Coffee, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Instant_coffee (last visited Apr. 10, 2011).
72
73
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have foreseen or prevented this development. Policymakers could,
however, have stopped the massive commercial R&D programs that
expanded the technology thereafter. Absent this groundwork, the Soviet
Union would have found it difficult, or impossible, to pursue genetically
engineered weapons in the 1970s and 1980s.
Surveying our case studies, it is clear that our hypothetical
regulators would have had little or no chance of blocking the
development of contagious disease (Case 4) and anthrax weapons (Case
5). On the other hand, ruthless intervention to defund academic research
would have stood an excellent chance of blocking the development of
atomic (Case 1), radiological (Case 2) and most pathogen weapons (Case
6). Similarly, international agreements to limit commercial R&D would
almost certainly have stopped the development of chemical weapons
(Case 3). Finally, combinations of ruthless defunding and limits on
commercial research could plausibly have prevented the development of
genetically engineered weapons (Case 7).
The key word, of course, is “ruthless.” Historically, real attempts to
stop WMD have usually focused on treaties to suppress government
R&D programs after the basic science has been established so that only
engineering problems remain. While occasionally effective, such treaties
are necessarily hard to verify and invite cheating.77 More recently,
government officials and academics have debated the feasibility of
stopping individual “experiments of concern” from going forward.78
Our examples suggest that this is unlikely to be more than a stopgap. In
the long arc of academic science, individual experiments will almost
always be so obvious—and the costs of performing them so modest—
that some scientist, somewhere, is bound to try them. For this reason,
suppression is unlikely to work for long.79
The case would be very different if policymakers were willing to
suppress commercial and academic research agendas over a period of
decades. After all, experiments showing that freeze-dried organisms can
be revived, or that uranium can be made to support chain reactions,
77
The point is amply documented by the history of chemical weapons treaties, in which
many countries originally developed new weapons defensively to study possible threats
and design countermeasures. See, e.g., HARRIS & PAXMAN, supra note 66, at 43−44, 48−49.
78
See infra Part V (discussing the experiments of concern problem).
79
Spencer R. Weart, Scientists with a Secret, PHYSICS TODAY, Feb. 1976, at 23–30.
Temporary suppression may sometimes be a useful goal. During the early days of World
War II, U.S. physicists organized an unofficial conspiracy to keep atomic physics research
secret. The effort ultimately helped block Nazi efforts to build a nuclear reactor. This
result was only useful, however, because the Allied war effort guaranteed that Nazi
Germany would build a bomb within five years, or not at all. Temporary suppression was
also a more feasible goal because it meant that the conspiracy’s organizers could promise
authors that their work would eventually be published.
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were not really serendipitous. Decades of academic or commercial effort
were required to reach the point where these experiments could be
proposed. Still other breakthrough experiments were unremarkable
installments in brute force campaigns to find better insecticides or
document radioactive decays across the periodic table. The larger point
is that even the clever experiments would usually have been unthinkable
had they not been part of much larger and longstanding research
agendas.
There are obvious political reasons why such steps have never been
taken. Nonetheless, such bans might also have been poor policy. After
all, WMD have killed relatively few people80 so far while their
underlying technologies have delivered significant civilian benefits.81
Even nuclear energy may yet turn out to be a good thing if it solves the
world’s energy and greenhouse problems.82 Still, the fact remains that
these questions could have been asked and action could have been taken.
Biosecurity policy is possible.
C. Is Synthetic Biology Special?
It is always, of course, possible to argue that synthetic biology is
qualitatively different from earlier dual-use technologies. In this case,
80
This does not, of course, mean that the risks were worth running ex ante. Most
obviously, there were many near-misses that could have led to nuclear war. See PETER
VINCENT PRY, WAR SCARE: RUSSIA AND AMERICA ON THE NUCLEAR BRINK (1999); SCOTT D.
SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY: ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS
(1993). Any attempt to quantify these risks is necessarily subjective. However, it is worth
noting that Soviet Premier Khrushchev privately warned his Politburo that the chances of a
nuclear war erupting over Berlin in 1961 were about five percent. FREDERICK KEMPE,
BERLIN 1961 205 (2011). Given the number of people who would die in such an exchange,
even this five percent probability would have given policymakers a persuasive case for
suppressing nuclear energy.
81
For example, the ability to freeze-dry organisms made it possible for biologists to
trade organisms by mail. This allowed scientists around the world to conduct experiments
on the same model organisms, which vastly accelerated research. See, e.g., SCOTT STERN,
BIOLOGICAL RESOURCE CENTERS: KNOWLEDGE HUBS FOR THE LIFE SCIENCES 20–22 (2004).
The discovery of nerve gases is similarly linked to the discovery of DDT, which has saved
millions of lives since World War II. See, e.g., Amir Attaran et al., Balancing Risks on the
Backs of the Poor, 6 NATURE MED. 729, 729–31 (2000).
82
In a strange way, the recent nuclear accident in Fukujima, Japan actually strengthens
the case for nuclear power. Back in the 1950s, it would have been reasonable to say that
mankind had very little information about how common and/or destructive nuclear
accidents would be. Today we have much better data about how often accidents occur
and, especially, their potential downside. Pro-nuclear activists are almost certainly correct
when they say that nuclear power has killed far fewer people than, say, the 100,000
workers who died mining coal during the twentieth century. William Tucker, Why I Still
Support Nuclear Power, Even After Fukushima, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2011,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704396904576226820013417298.html.
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arguments that today’s WMD technologies could have been controlled
might not matter. That said, the existing evidence seems to fit the
historical pattern. Synthetic biology’s first decade produced two clear
experiments of concern—synthetic polio and then 1918 influenza—both
of which were clearly predictable and even routine by the time they were
performed.83 As in our WMD examples, these results could only have
been stopped by blocking the relevant academic research agendas
decades ago.84
V. PREVENTING WMD BREAKTHROUGHS: THE “EXPERIMENTS OF
CONCERN” PROBLEM
Part IV argued that society can plausibly control existing WMD
technologies and sometimes even steer R&D away from dangerous
topics. However, we have said little about how such interventions might
be designed in the case of synthetic biology. This section reviews efforts
to steer synthetic biology R&D away from paths that would make
weapons more powerful and easier to acquire. In practice, this debate
has focused almost entirely on identifying and regulating so-called
“experiments of concern.”
This section will consider efforts to
discourage and/or censor such experiments. Parts VI and VII will detail
the parallel debates over how best to control synthetic biology
technologies that already exist.
A. Censoring Results
Probably the most obvious way to control synthetic biology R&D is
to suppress dangerous results if and when they are discovered. Shortly
after 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) and the White
House announced that they were developing regulations to control the
“discussion and publication” of non-classified research that could
nevertheless affect national security.85 Alarmed, the American Society

83
The decade’s most controversial molecular biology experiment outside synthetic
biology was almost certainly the demonstration that mousepox could be made more
virulent.
84
That said, blocking the experiments might still have delayed the demonstration and
dissemination of these technologies for a few years. While it has become fashionable to talk
of the fight against terrorism as “The Long War,” there is no obvious reason why Al-Qaeda
could not collapse or at least become drastically less capable within the next decade. In
that case, suppressing artificial virus technology for even a few years could still be a useful
investment.
85
For further details, see, e.g., Steinbruner & Harris, supra note 34, at 5.
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for Microbiology (“ASM”) asked the U.S. National Academy of Sciences
(“NAS”) to explore voluntary alternatives.86
The result was a high-profile national workshop in August 2002.87
Attendees were evenly divided between security professionals from the
public and private sectors and academics including research scientists,
journal editors, and scientific society officials. The group spent most of
its time debating a proposal that would have restricted publication for
six types of research that could be used to turn Select Agents into
practical weapons.88 However, this proposal failed in the face of
opposition from universities, journals, and scientists.89 Unable to reach

Id.
Raymond A. Zilinskas & Jonathan B. Tucker, Limiting the Contribution of the Open
Scientific Literature to the Biological Weapons Threat, J. HOMELAND SECURITY, Dec. 3, 2002,
http://www.homelandsecurity.org/newjournal/articles/tucker.html. The Workshop on
Guidelines for the Publication of Scientific Research Potentially Related to Biological and
Toxin Warfare was held on August 12, 2002 in Washington, D.C. Id. at n.1.
88
Id. Participants at the workshop discussed categories that included research designed
to:
Enhance pathogen infectivity, pathogenicity, antibiotic resistance,
or resistance to host immunological defenses.
Improve the ability of a microbial pathogen to remain viable and
virulent during prolonged storage and/or after release into the
environment.
Facilitate the dissemination of biological agents as a fine-particle
aerosol.
Facilitate the dissemination of a biological agent by
contamination of food or water sources.
Create a novel pathogen or one with characteristics that have
been altered to evade current detection methods or host immune
defenses.
Assemble oligonucleotides to synthesize the genome of a
pathogenic microorganism.
Id. (numbering omitted).
89
Id. Academic scientists reportedly made the following arguments:
•
The proposal appears to establish a system for national
censorship in which scientific journals would be the guardians of
the censored material. . . .
•
Research universities and scientific journals would not agree to
the proposed mechanism. . . .
•
The proposed review process ignores the fact that the intellectual
knowledge generated under grants (as opposed to contracts) is
the property of the investigator[s] and that many research
projects involve students and foreign nationals. . . .
•
Scientists may be unwilling to take on the responsibility of
reviewing a potentially “sensitive” paper . . . .
•
Scientific journals are not set up to deal with the segregation of
sensitive data or to provide for secure means of review and
publication. . . .
86
87
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agreement, the group threw the question back into the academic research
community’s lap by calling on “bioscientists and their professional
organizations [to] take the lead in informing security experts how best to
meet the threats of biological warfare and terrorism” in a way that
would not unduly harm the scientific enterprise.90
Government officials renewed the pressure to act at a second NAS
meeting in January 2003 in which they called on the scientific
community, and especially journal editors, to “devise a better process”
for handling unclassified research.91 This time, the statement was
accompanied by an explicit threat that scientists needed to “come up
with a process before the public demands the government do it for
them.”92
Journal editors responded to this pressure by announcing “that they
hoped to release a joint statement shortly.”93 The resulting Journal
Editors Group Statement was duly published on February 21, 2003.94
The twenty-nine signatories included sixteen past or present editors of
leading science journals including JAMA, New England Journal of
Medicine, Nature, and Science.95 Two professional society publishers,96

•

Once a document has been designated “Restricted,” it must be
tracked and its security monitored. . . .
•
. . . The proposed system would impose high legal and
professional risks on journals, with minimal benefits.
Id. Most participants were, however, willing to concede “that under rare circumstances,
the open communication of unclassified research could pose such a high risk of substantial
harm as to warrant controlling the distribution of that information.” Id.
90
Id. (emphasis added).
91
Erica Check, US Officials Urge Biologists to Vet Publications for Bioterror Risk, 421
NATURE 197, 197 (2003).
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Journal Editors & Authors Group, Statement on Scientific Publication and Security, 299
SCIENCE 1149 (2003).
95
See Journal Editors and Authors Group, SCI., http://www.sciencemag.org/content/299/
5610/1149/rel-suppl/46c0b496b5237cd0/suppl/DC1 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) (listing
among the signatories Ronald Atlas, Critical Reviews in Microbiology; Philip Campbell,
Nature; Nicholas R. Cozzarelli, PNAS; Greg Curfman, New England Journal of Medicine; Lynn
Enquist, Journal of Virology; Annette Flanagin, Journal of the American Medical Association;
Gordon Hammes, Biochemistry; Donald Kennedy, Science; Emilie Marcus, Neuron; Alison
O’Brien, Infection and Immunity; Andrew Onderdonk, Journal of Clinical Microbiology;
Beatrice Renault, Nature Medicine; Robert Rich, Journal of Immunology; Thomas Shenk,
Journal of Virology; Herbert Tabor, Journal of Biological Chemistry; and Keith Yamamoto,
Molecular Biology of the Cell).
96
Id. (Samuel Kaplan, Chair, American Society for Microbiology Publications Board; and
Mary Scanlan, Director of Publishing Operations, American Chemical Society).
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three U.S. government agencies,97 two security intellectuals,98 five
academic biologists,99 and a free speech activist100 also signed the
document. Reflecting what appears to have been mainstream opinion at
both NAS workshops, the group acknowledged that information should
sometimes be suppressed. Crucially, however, it left the actual decision
to individual editors:
We recognize that on occasion an editor may conclude
that the potential harm of publication outweighs the
potential societal benefits. Under such circumstances,
the paper should be modified, or not be published.
Scientific information is also communicated by other
means: seminars, meetings, electronic posting, etc.
Journals and scientific societies can play an important
role in encouraging investigators to communicate results
of research in ways that maximize public benefits and
minimize risks of misuse.101
The obvious problem with this statement was that it asked each
editor to reach her own individual judgment about the balance of harms.
This necessarily implied a weakest-link dynamic in which the
community could only suppress papers if every single editor agreed. As
of 2003, however, it was still possible to think that editors would
eventually close this loophole by negotiating detailed procedures and
standards for deciding when papers should be suppressed.102 Fatally,
this was not done.103
97
Id. (Elizabeth George, National Nuclear Security Administration/Department of
Energy; Rachel Levinson, Office of Science and Technology Policy; and Harold Varmus and
Henry Metzger, National Institutes of Health).
98
Id. (David Heyman, Center for Strategic and International Studies; and Thomas
Inglesby, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism).
99
Id. (Gerald Fink, MIT; Stephen S. Morse, Columbia University; Steven Salzberg,
Institute for Genomic Research; Ariella Rosengard, University of Pennsylvania; and Eckard
Wimmer, Stony Brook).
100
Id. (Judith Krug, Office for Intellectual Freedom, American Libraries Association).
101
Id.
102
The most obvious solution would be to create an advice panel containing some
suitable mix of security experts and academic scientists. This would automatically ensure
quality and consistency across decisions. Some biologists called for an international
committee to guide scientists whose work produced unexpectedly dangerous results even
before 9/11. See generally Steinbruner & Harris, supra note 34.
103
Academic scientists did, however, press for general rules defining data that should
not be classified. See e.g., COMM. ON GENOMICS DATABASES FOR BIOTERRORISM, NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADS., SEEKING SECURITY: PATHOGENS, OPEN ACCESS,
AND GENOME DATABASES 25–27 (2004) [hereinafter SEEKING SECURITY] (discussing openaccess policies for genome databases).
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The crisis came in 2005 after Science editor-in-chief Donald Kennedy
published an extraordinary editorial defending his journal’s decision to
publish a synthetic biology paper whose authors had successfully
resurrected the 1918 influenza virus.104 The first part of Kennedy’s
defense—that Science had only reached its decision after consulting with
the heads of the Centers for Disease Control, the U.S. National Institute
of Allergy and Infectious Disease, and NIH’s Office of Biotechnology
Activities—was unexceptional.105 The problem, Kennedy went on to
explain, was that the head of NIH had not been satisfied and asked
Science to contact the NSABB as well. Because Science had complied, one
might have expected Kennedy to congratulate himself on taking this
extra step. Instead, he loudly claimed that his “convictions” would have
led him to publish the paper even if NSABB had wanted it suppressed.106
In effect, Kennedy had publicly announced that he would publish what
he liked—and dared critics to criticize him. No one did.
Three years after 9/11, it was clear that neither the public nor the
Bush Administration cared enough to press the issue. Instead, each
editor was now free to do whatever she thought best—a result which
more or less guaranteed that every experiment would be published by
some journal somewhere. As Professor Selgelid remarked, the editors’
extended flirtation with self-censorship had ended in an “unacceptable”
result.107
B. Discouraging “Experiments of Concern”
The obvious alternative to censorship is to review controversial
experiments before they start. Unlike censorship, this strategy can do
little to suppress unexpected results. At the same time, it has the
practical advantage that a blocked experiment produces no results, and
is therefore far easier to suppress. Pre-experiment review also avoids

Donald Kennedy, Better Never Than Late, 310 SCI. 195, 195 (2005).
A careful reader might, however, have worried that none of the reviewers had any
obvious weapons experience. As Malcolm Dando and colleagues have repeatedly
documented, biological weapons are a distinct and complex academic sub-discipline. The
fact that someone is a famous biologist (and in this case a Washington insider) does not
necessarily mean that he or she is capable of spotting, let alone deciding, complex dual-use
issues.
106
Kennedy, supra note 104, at 195 (“So would I, given our own convictions, the timing,
and what we had learned from our consultations with Gerberding, Fauci, and others, have
published the paper even if the NSABB had voted otherwise? Absolutely—unless they had
it classified.”).
107
Michael J. Selgelid, A Tale of Two Studies: Ethics, Bioterrorism, and the Censorship of
Science, HASTINGS CENTER REP., May–June 2007, at 35, 41.
104
105
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asking experimenters to discard months and perhaps even years of
work.
By 2003, academics had recommended various review schemes that
could be implemented through voluntary self-governance108 or
government regulation.109
These scattered proposals received a
powerful boost in 2004 when the Fink Committee called on NIH to
expand its existing review procedures to include what it termed
“experiments of concern,” i.e., research that could make biological
weapons cheaper or more effective.110 In general, this recommendation
was warmly received by the synthetic biology establishment, who hoped
to obtain increased government funding and needed a convincing but
Promising an
uncomplicated answer to biosecurity concerns.111
additional review layer was an easy way to do this.
Fatally, the Fink Committee failed to say what this new review
system would look like. Instead, it asked the federal government to
convene an advisory committee to fill this gap.112 Ultimately, this new
Gigi Kwik et al., Biosecurity: Responsible Stewardship of Bioscience in an Age of
Catastrophic Terrorism, 1 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI.
27 (2003).
109
See JOHN STEINBRUNER ET AL., CTR. FOR INT’L & SEC. STUDIES AT MD., CONTROLLING
DANGEROUS PATHOGENS: A PROTOTYPE PROTECTIVE OVERSIGHT SYSTEM (2003), available at
http://www.cissm.umd.edu/papers/files/pathogens_project_monograph.pdf (envisaging
a worldwide system).
110
SEEKING SECURITY, supra note 103, at 17–18. The “experiments of concern” definition
combined the six “weaponization” criteria developed at the National Academies’ August
2002 Workshop with a somewhat recursive seventh category covering experiments that
“[e]nable the weaponization of a biological agent or toxin.” Id. at 18. The call was
immediately echoed by a Royal Society Report in the United Kingdom. THE ROYAL SOC’Y
& WELLCOME TRUST, DO NO HARM: REDUCING THE POTENTIAL FOR THE MISUSE OF LIFE
SCIENCE RESEARCH 1 (2004), available at http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/stellent/groups/
corporatesite/@policy_communications/documents/web_document/wtx023408.pdf
(“Research institutions and funding agencies need to consider how to build on existing
processes for reviewing research projects to ensure that risks of misuse are assessed in an
appropriate and timely manner.”).
111
The connection between money and review was particularly evident in the highprofile Gesteland Committee, then about to recommend that the U.S. Department of
Energy massively increase its synthetic biology research budget. Embracing the Fink
Committee’s proposed review system allowed the Committee to treat security as if the
problem had already been solved. See DEP’T OF ENERGY BIOLOGICAL & ENVTL. RESEARCH
ADVISORY COMM., DEP’T OF ENERGY, SYNTHETIC GENOMES: TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPACT 8
(2004) [hereinafter BERAC], available at http://www.science.doe.gov/ober/berac/
SynBio.pdf (last visited March 20, 2011) (“Acknowledging the potential for misuse of
synthetic genome technology before adequate defenses can be mounted, [and arguing that]
it would be prudent for scientists to work together with experts in national security to
explore and develop practical strategies to prevent . . . its misuse, as recommended by the
[Fink] Committee.”).
112
NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BD. FOR BIOSECURITY, PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE OVERSIGHT
OF DUAL USE LIFE SCIENCES RESEARCH: STRATEGIES FOR MINIMIZING THE POTENTIAL MISUSE
108
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National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (“NSABB”) did little
more than repeat the Fink Committee’s call for government action
without adding useful specifics.113 This left the ball squarely in HHS’s
court. Five years later, HHS still has no procedure for reviewing
biosecurity issues. The agency has, however, promised to revisit the
review issue as part of a broader initiative to create a “culture of
responsibility” for dual-use technologies.114
In the meantime, many biologists saw no point in waiting and took
action. Since the Fink report, roughly one-third of all U.S. research
universities have modified their safety reviews to include at least some
security issues.115 By far the most ambitious example was a multiuniversity collaboration called the Southeast Regional Center of
Excellence for Emerging Infections and Biodefense (“SERCEB”).116 It
operated a mandatory review system for member scientists from 2004 to
2009. As of 2007, SERCEB had reviewed twenty-seven research
proposals, of which ten were found to include significant research of
concern.117 These risks were managed through various strategies
including training, physical security, experimental design, and limited
published descriptions of sensitive methods.118 Interestingly, SERCEB
never halted or significantly delayed a project.119 Indeed, its leadership
reports that it became steadily more likely to avoid this outcome as time
passed.120
OF RESEARCH INFORMATION (2007) [hereinafter NSABB], available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/
biosecurity/pdf/Framework%20for%20transmittal%200807_Sept07.pdf.
113
See id. at 10. NSABB suggested that experimenters who failed to seek review might be
subject to unspecified “penalties.” Alternatively, compliance could “perhaps” be made “a
term and condition of funding” or else a factor to be considered in grant applications. Id.
114
Public Consultation on Personnel Reliability and Culture of Responsibility Issues, 75
Fed. Reg. 76,997 (Dec. 10, 2010).
115
E-mail from Robert Cook-Deegan, Ctr. for Genome Ethics, Law & Policy, Duke
University, to author (March 1, 2011, 12:18 EST) [hereinafter Cook-Deegan E-mail] (on file
with author).
116
SERCEB’s main member institutions included Duke, Emory, Vanderbilt, the
University of North Carolina, the University of Florida, and the University of Alabama at
Birmingham. Id.
117
We will see that this rate is roughly 1,000 times higher than biology as a whole. See
infra text accompanying note 123. The discrepancy is almost certainly explained by
SERCEB’s unusual focus on infectious diseases and biodefense research.
118
E. Megan Davidson et al., Practical Experiences in Dual Use Review, 316 SCIENCE 1432,
1433 (2007).
119
Id. at 1433. This continued to be true until the end of the program. See Cook-Deegan
E-mail, supra note 115.
120
Davidson et al., supra note 118, at 1432. On at least two occasions, SERCEB reviewers
adopted this position in cases where the researchers themselves would have recommended
suppressing publication and destroying their research materials. See E. Megan Davidson et
al., Supporting Online Material for Practical Experiences in Dual-Use Review, SCI. AAAS (June 8,
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Since 2007, the NIH has similarly required thousands of intramural
scientists to report any experiments of concern to a special Dual Use
Screening Committee. To date, the Committee has responded to several
inquiries. No “experiments or reporting of . . . results have required
modification based on dual use concerns.”121 Finally, a group at the
Goldman School of Public Policy at Berkeley has operated an online
advice portal since April 2009. It has received no inquiries to date.122
While disappointing, these results are not very surprising. They do,
however, teach two important lessons. First, experiments of concern are
very, very rare. Indeed, it has been estimated that experiments of
concern account for just 0.03% of all molecular biology experiments.123
This suggests that even very aggressive systems may not generate large
numbers of reviews. Second, rank-and-file community members did not
wait for government action. Instead, they established their own
voluntary review systems. Section VIII will describe other instances in
which synthetic biologists have moved faster and more decisively than
regulators.

2007),
http://www.sciencemag.org/content/suppl/2007/06/05/316.5830.1432.DC1/
Davidson-SOM.pdf. There are several possible reasons for this divergence. First, SERCEB
leaders have had more time for study and reflection than individual researchers. In this
case, allowing the experiments to proceed was simply the best outcome. Second, SERCEB’s
leaders may have valued scientific freedom more than the average community member.
This is plausible because researchers with strong views often self-select into leadership
roles. Finally, SERCEB leaders may have been protecting the community from an
externalities problem. Public controversy is expensive; therefore, investigators may
sometimes suppress results even when publication is appropriate. In this view, SERCEB’s
strong defense of publication gave researchers the political cover they needed to make the
right decision.
121
E-mail from Henry Metzger, Scientist Emeritus, Nat’l Inst. of Arthritis &
Musculoskeletal & Skin Diseases, Nat’l Insts. of Health, to author (Mar. 9, 2011, 10:08 EST)
[hereinafter Metzger E-mail] (on file with author).
122
Barry Bergman, Goldman School Portal Takes the Worry Out of ‘Experiments of Concern’,
THE BERKELEYAN, April 2, 2009, http://www.berkeley.edu/news/berkeleyan/2009/04/
02_concern.shtml. Peter Aldhous, Are Fears Over Bioterrorism Stifling Scientific Research?,
NEW SCIENTIST (Feb. 5, 2009), http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16539-are-fearsover-bioterrorism-stifling-scientific-research.html. The facility will shut down in June 2011.
Erika Check Hayden, ‘Experiments of Concern’ to Be Vetted On Line: Expert Panel to Offer
Advice on Science with Bioterror Applications, 457 NATURE 643, 643 (2009).
123
Jeffrey Brainard, Advisory Panel Proposes That Scientists Monitor Their Own SecurityRelated Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., April 20, 2007; see also STEINBRUNER ET AL., supra
note 109, at 45 (arguing that experiments of concern account for well under one percent of
all experiments).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 4

1416 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

VI. CONTROLLING EXISTING TECHNOLOGY (A): CODES OF CONDUCT,
EDUCATION, AND TECHNICAL MEASURES
Most observers agree that existing synthetic biology technologies
pose risks that justify at least modest control efforts. This Part reviews
various measures, including codes of conduct, educational initiatives,
and technology solutions that synthetic biologists have debated over the
past decade. Efforts to control access to artificial DNA are discussed
separately in Part VII.
A. Codes of Conduct
Professional societies have adopted several codes of conduct since
the 1980s, which prohibit biologists from developing weapons. These
efforts arguably intensified after 9/11.124 By 2005, the World Medical
Association, British Royal Society, Red Cross, UN General Assembly, UN
Security Council, UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee,
Wellcome Trust, and sixty-eight national academies of science were
calling on researchers to draft still more codes.125 These calls were
seconded in the United States by the National Research Council’s highprofile Fink (2004)126 and Relman (2006)127 reports.
Against this background, synthetic biologists began discussing their
own code as early 2003.128 By 2005, many community members agreed
that a code would be useful, although these discussions remained
“fragmentary.”129 Furthermore, there were widespread expectations that
SB2.0 would make “significant progress” on the issue when it met in
2006.130 While these hopes turned out to be premature,131 community
members and outside scholars have continued to call for a code ever
since.132
See Brian Rappert, Responsibility in the Life Sciences: Assessing the Role of Professional
Codes, 2 BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 164, 164–74
(2004) (discussing a detailed history of these efforts).
125
Id.; see also INTERACADEMY PANEL ON INT’L ISSUES, IAP STATEMENT ON BIOSECURITY 2
(2005) (listing the organizations that endorse the call for researchers to draft more codes).
126
FINK REPORT, supra note 38.
127
COMM. ON ADVANCES IN TECH. & THE PREVENTION OF THEIR APPLICATION TO NEXT
GENERATION BIOWARFARE THREATS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, GLOBALIZATION,
BIOSECURITY, AND THE FUTURE OF THE LIFE SCIENCES (2006) [hereinafter RELMAN REPORT).
128
See, e.g., Endy, supra note 28, at 5 (“As one obvious example, biological engineering
training could include professional development programs and codes of ethics. . . .).
129
Church, supra note 43, at 423.
130
Id.
131
See infra Part VIII.A.
132
See e.g., EUROPEAN GRP. ON ETHICS IN SCI. & NEW TECHS. TO THE EUROPEAN COMM’N,
OPINION NO. 25:
ETHICS OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY (Nov. 17, 2009), available at
124
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Why, then, is there still no synthetic biology code? Professor
Rappert argues that the problem is political. Calls for codes usually
reflect a fragile alliance between researchers who care about security,
and those who mainly want to preempt government action.133 These
groups almost always disagree as soon as the code project moves from
generalities to specific “content or plans for promulgation.”134 Rappert’s
observation also explains why the written codes “are less consequential
and compliance-oriented and more circular than they might appear at
first glance.”135
In 2004, the Fink Committee tried to sidestep this dynamic by asking
the federal government to create an entirely new body—the NSABB—to
make the hard choices that codes demand. However, the NSABB
refused to grasp the nettle. Instead, it only produced what it called a
“resource” that “scientific societies, professional associations, and
research institutions” could use to write codes of their own.136 While
NSABB suggests that some of its “considerations” can be adopted
verbatim, these are bland indeed.137
In the meantime, the National Research Council’s Relman
Committee in 2006 proposed a second way around the problem: create
online forums where members can report problems, share best practices,
and eventually write codes together.138 Though the Committee did not
say so, the tactic makes political sense because such forums will
disproportionately attract scientists who sincerely care about reform.
Forums also make practical sense. Synthetic biology is so new that
researchers may not know enough to identify threats or design sensible
http://ec.europa.eu/european_group_ethics/docs/opinion25_en.pdf; RINIE VAN EST ET
AL., RATHENAU INST., CONSTRUCTING A WORLD OF LIFE: THE WORLD OF SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY
(2007).
133
Rappert, Responsibility, supra note 124.
134
Id. at 164.
135
Brian Rappert, Codes of Conduct and Biological Weapons: An In-Process Assessment, 5
BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM: BIODEFENSE STRATEGY, PRAC., & SCI. 145, 150 (2007).
136
NSABB, supra note 112, at 28–29. The document also stressed proper communication,
thereby implying that the security problem had as much to do with public perception as
any actual threat. Id.
137
The document urges researchers, inter alia, to “[c]onsider[]” whether their work could
be misused, “[s]triv[e]” to design research that avoids dual-use concerns, “[w]eigh[]
carefully” the benefits of the research against harms that could occur, and observe safe and
ethical behaviors. Id. at 48. Similarly, it urges funding agencies to make sure that
“appropriate systems are in place” to review experiments of concern and “[e]nsur[e] that
both researchers and reviewers are knowledgeable of, and adhere to, all ethical,
institutional, and legal requirements.” Id. at 48–49. The document does nothing to define
these and similarly ambiguous terms. Nor does it explain how this framework would be
applied to any specific example.
138
RELMAN REPORT, supra note 127.
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solutions. Forums are a natural way to collect this information. Sadly,
the Relman Committee’s proposal was never implemented.139
B. How Useful Would It Be?
Before leaving the subject, one should ask what purpose codes could
serve. Here, the naïve view—that a rule against making biological
weapons will suppress terrorism—is almost certainly wrong. Terrorists,
after all, have extreme and very strong beliefs. Even if we admit that
codes might influence the average person, their effect on terrorists is
almost certainly negligible.
A more sensible justification is that most people, and Americans in
particular, are reluctant to investigate and tell authorities about
suspicious activities. Publicly affirming the value of whistleblowers
could plausibly increase scientists’ willingness to step forward. In
principle, code adoption could also encourage scientists working in
covert state weapons programs to defect.140 As former Soviet weapons
scientist Ken Alibek has stressed, it is hard to work for a biological
weapons program when the world clearly despises such methods.
Beyond these limited examples, it is hard to know what purpose a
biosecurity code would serve. Some activities, notably biosafety, lend
themselves to the explicit, step-by-step instructions that codes provide.
But few biosecurity tasks are like this.141 Instead, threats come in many
different and often subtle forms. Here, a code’s main function may be to
remind researchers that they are not competent to judge biosecurity risk
and should turn to outside experts when issues arise.142
C. Education
Codes of conduct are only effective when researchers are able to
recognize problematic experiments. However, empirical studies show
139
The Sloan Foundation studied but ultimately rejected the forum idea based on survey
evidence that synthetic biologists would not participate absent “the threat of government
regulation or some other external pressure on the scientific community.” Pearson, supra
note 32, at 6.
140
Codes will not, of course, encourage many scientists to defect. This may not matter,
however, for covert state weapons programs that employ dozens and even hundreds of
scientists, only one of whom must defect to reveal the secret.
141
One important exception, as we will see, is screening DNA orders for possible threat
sequences. See infra Part VII (describing screening methods). This activity, however, is
much too specialized to include in a community-wide synthetic biology code.
142
Such codes only make sense if the advice is actually obtainable. However, many
researchers may have trouble locating qualified biosecurity experts. The Berkeley project
has established its online advice portal to help fill this gap. See supra note 122 and
accompanying text.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/4

Maurer: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End? Synthetic Biology's

2011]

Synthetic Biology’s Stalled Security Agenda

1419

that life scientists know very little about dual-use issues.143 The National
Research Council’s Fink and Relman Committees have both called for
improved, and perhaps mandatory, biosecurity education to fill this gap.
In the meantime, some biologists moved forward with voluntary
initiatives. For example, SERCEB had administered a dual-use training
module to more than 450 scientists by 2007.144 Similarly, NIH has
repeatedly reminded its intramural researchers of dual-use issues, most
recently in its Research Ethics Case Discussion exercise for 2009–2010.145
Other groups that have developed education modules include the
Federation of American Scientists, Bradford University, and the Center
for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation.146
Despite this, government has yet to say how much, if any, security
education synthetic biologists should receive. In 2010, NSABB published
a report chiding the U.S. federal government for its failure to implement
an “oversight paradigm.”147 The report also called on government to
develop “[o]utreach and education strategies” aimed at “raising
awareness of the dual use issue among synthetic biology’s diverse
practitioners, especially among those that have not been participants in
recent discussions on this topic.”148 HHS is currently considering
regulations to implement some or all of these recommendations,
although it is still not clear what will emerge.
D. Technical Measures
Given synthetic biology’s strong focus on engineering, it was more
or less inevitable that members would suggest technical measures to
BRIAN RAPPERT, BIOTECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND THE SEARCH FOR LIMITS: AN INQUIRY
RESEARCH AND METHODS (2007). SERCEB’s in-house program for reporting and
reviewing experiments of concern similarly found that “few investigators were aware of
the dual-use dilemma,” that “many investigators were unaware of dual-use issues in their
own research,” and that “sensitivity to dual-use concerns is highly subjective.” Davidson
et al., supra note 118, at 1432–33.
144
Davidson et al., supra note 118, at 1433.
145
Metzger E-mail, supra note 121.
146
See Biosecurity Education Portal, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/
programs/bio/educationportal.html (last visited March 23, 2011).
147
NAT’L SCI. ADVISORY BOARD FOR BIOSECURITY, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY CONCERNS
RELATED TO SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY iii (2010) [hereinafter NSABB, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY],
available at http://oba.od.nih.gov/biosecurity/pdf/NSABB%20SynBio%20DRAFT%20
Report-FINAL%20(2)_6-7-10.pdf.
148
Id. at 13. The reference “diverse practitioners” provides a broad hint that some
groups—for example, mainstream biologists—may need less education than others. This
foreshadows the Presidential Commission on Bioethics’ more recent claim that synthetic
biology’s “culture of responsibility” is already adequate and that future initiatives should
focus on extending it to other groups. See infra Part IX.C (describing the Commission’s
synthetic biology report).
143
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reduce risk. These have taken various forms. Probably the best-known
idea has been to insert hidden (“steganographic”) messages, also known
as watermarks, into gene sequences. This data would bolster deterrence
by helping authorities trace DNA used in attacks back to its source. The
idea has been current since 2002149 and was widely discussed at SB1.0150
and in the weeks preceding SB2.0.151 So far, however, it has yet to be
implemented in practical experiments.
A second popular idea is to modify the “chassis” organisms that
synthetic biologists use to host their designs so that they could not
survive in the wild, were programmed to self-destruct after a fixed time,
or included artificial genes that could not function in naturally occurring
organisms.152 The Venter Institute took a first step in this direction by
deliberately engineering its Mycoplasma mycoides bacterium so that the
organism cannot cause disease in humans or survive outside the
laboratory.153
Finally, some synthetic biologists believe that customers will
eventually be able to make genes on tabletop machines. In principle,
these devices could be programmed so that they refused to make
problematic sequences.154
E. Conclusion
Despite extensive discussion, synthetic biologists have done
relatively little to implement codes of conduct. They have, however,
developed important voluntary review and education programs. HHS
may eventually make some form of review and education mandatory.
VII. CONTROLLING EXISTING TECHNOLOGY (B): DENYING SYNTHETIC DNA
TO TERRORISTS
The proposals so far would apply to almost any branch of
microbiology. One issue, however, is specific to synthetic biology. We

See Andrew D. Ellington, Intelligence Countermeasures for Biological Threats passim
(2002) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (discussing the use of “genetic
taggants” within the context of biological terrorism).
150
Carlson, supra note 42.
151
Stephen M. Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action: Community-Based Options for
Improving Safety and Security in Synthetic Biology (Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working
Paper Draft 1.1, 2006), available at http://gspp.berkeley.edu/iths/UC%20White%20Paper.
pdf.
152
Church, supra note 43, at 423; Pennisi, supra note 45, at 769.
153
Steinbruner & Harris, supra note 34.
154
SCI. POLICY CTR., THE ROYAL SOC’Y, NEW APPROACHES TO BIOLOGICAL RISK
ASSESSMENT 9 (2009).
149
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have seen that the synthetic biology revolution was built on cheap
commercial sources of DNA. Denying this resource to would-be
terrorists has become synthetic biology’s most-discussed priority.155
A. Licensing
The most obvious way to control synthetic DNA is to license the
equipment and reagents that make it. Synthetic biologists discussed this
option widely in the wake of 9/11,156 and many scholars still endorse it
today.157 At the same time, implementation would require congressional
action. This makes licensing politically unlikely, at least in the short
term.
B. Screening Technologies
We have already seen that most commercial gene-makers began
screening customer orders shortly after 9/11. However, these programs
were developed in isolation and tend to be inconsistent. The basic issue
is how much effort companies should invest before deciding that a
particular order is legitimate. In practice, there are three choices:
(1) human screening, (2) predefined threat lists, and (3) advanced
software.
Despite differences in detail, most of today’s gene-makers follow the
first strategy—human screening. The process begins by having a
computer compare the customer’s order against the U.S. government’s
exhaustive Genbank database to find the nearest matches among
reported genes. At this point, human experts examine each match’s
known function as reported in Genbank annotations or the underlying
literature. These functions turn out to be problematic about one percent
155
The Department of Energy’s Gesteland Report had already noted in 2004 that
synthetic biologists faced the special problem of “monitoring DNA sequences shipped
from DNA synthesis facilities capable of producing large segments of DNA.” BERAC,
supra note 111, at 8.
156
Carlson, supra note 42 (“Not for the first time in this circle did I hear suggestions of
licensing for scientists and of strict controls on the distribution of technology and
reagents.”); see also Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151, at 18
(documenting prevalence of licensing idea among synthetic biologists in the 2005- 2006
time frame).
157
See, e.g., EUROPEAN GRP., supra note 132 (arguing that departments or research groups
that use synthetic biology to perform biodefense experiments should be licensed and listed
in a central registry); GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45 (describing options for registering
synthesis machines and owners and people who purchase reagents); George Church, A
Synthetic Bio-Hazard Non-Proliferation Proposal (Aug. 6, 2004) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://arep.med.harvard.edu/SBP/Church_Biohazard04c.doc (discussing
licensing scheme for reagents and instruments).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 4

1422 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

of the time.
In such cases, companies must conduct further
investigations to make sure that the sequence is being purchased for
legitimate research. Companies typically do this by checking the
customer’s identity, asking about the proposed experiment, and, if
necessary, consulting the authorities.158
The current alternative to human screening relies on predefined lists.
Instead of relying on employees to conduct research and make threat
judgments after orders are received, companies could simply identify
every Genbank threat in advance. Once this list existed, human experts
could be safely replaced by computers. The problem, for now, is that
existing threat lists are still painfully incomplete. This suggests that
human screening will continue to outperform list-based systems for at
least a decade.159
Lastly, existing screening methods are based on comparing
requested DNA against similar sequences with known functions. Some
day scientists may be able to detect threats by inspecting the requested
sequence itself. For now, this remains a distant goal.160 That said, some
researchers are writing advanced software to partially solve the problem.
It is still not clear how well this will work.161
While human screening works best today, other methods could
eventually overtake it. The real difference is economic. While human
screening costs little on average, experts can and do spend up to two
hours in individual cases. These costs are significant in an industry
where the typical gene sells for about $10,000. Automated solutions
based on software or predefined lists would cut this cost nearly to zero.
C. Screening Goals
Over time, the debate over screening has come to include four
sometimes incompatible goals. The first, and by far the most obvious, is
security—i.e., protecting human and animal life from terrorism. This
goal predominates in all public discussions and supplies the political
pressure for regulation. Over time, however, various subsidiary
considerations have crept in.
The first involves companies’
understandable desire to know when they have complied with U.S. law.
See Maurer et al., supra note 1 (describing current industry screening practices).
E-mail from Tom Slezak, Lawrence Livermore Nat’l Lab., to author (Mar. 1, 2011,
12:42 PST) (on file with author).
160
COMM. ON SCIENTIFIC MILESTONES FOR THE DEV. OF A GENE SEQUENCE-BASED
CLASSIFICATION SYS. FOR THE OVERSIGHT OF SELECT AGENTS, NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION OF SELECT AGENTS: A BRIGHTER LINE (2010) [hereinafter
SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION].
161
See Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 24–25.
158
159
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While Congress’s Select Agent statute clearly applies to DNA, it has
never been clear which sequences are covered. Companies and
regulators want to eliminate this ambiguity.162
Relatedly, companies also prefer screening systems in which threat
judgments are replicable. This goal is poorly served by human screeners
who can and sometimes do draw different threat judgments from the
same data. Some gene-makers have objected to this on the ground that
threat judgments should be “consistent” from one company to the
next.163 The downside, of course, is that consistency is not accuracy.
Indeed, a system could have a 100% error rate and still be consistent,
provided it made the same mistakes every time.
Finally, companies would like to automate screening as much as
possible. Large gene-makers, in particular, have invested heavily in
automation that allows them to make DNA faster and cheaper than their
competitors. Automated screening would enhance this advantage by
eliminating the cost and delay associated with manual screening.
On balance, it seems clear that screening’s original core purpose—
biosecurity—favors solutions based on human screening. On the other
hand, statutory compliance, consistency, and competitive considerations
all favor automated screening. Government, industry, and academics
have spent much of the past decade trying to balance these
considerations.
D. (Mis-)Framing the Debate
This tradeoff between human and automated screening methods is
surely fundamental. Strangely, however, most synthetic biology reports
give human screening short shrift or overlook it entirely. Part of the
problem has to do with how threats are defined.
Historically,
biosecurity professionals have almost always sided with the Relman
Committee’s judgment that policymakers need to be aware of non-Select
Agent threats, including other naturally occurring pathogens and even
synthetic organisms.164 Furthermore, most synthetic biology studies
have similarly embraced this position.165 But this presents a problem.
See, e.g., Hans Bügl et al., DNA Synthesis and Biological Security, 25 NATURE
BIOTECHNOLOGY 627, 628 (2007).
163
See, e.g., Claes Gustafsson Presentation Slides, FBI “Building Bridges” Conference, San
Francisco, Cal. (Aug. 4–5, 2009) (on file with the author). Gustafsson is DNA2.0’s Vice
President for Marketing.
164
RELMAN REPORT, supra note 127; see also Eileen R. Choffnes et al., A Brave New World in
the Life Sciences: The Breadth of Biological Threats Is Much Broader Than Commonly Thought and
Will Continue to Expand, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 26–33 (arguing that
the biosecurity threat is much broader than Select Agent organisms).
165
See, e.g., Campos, supra note 1; SEQUENCE-BASED CLASSIFICATION, supra note 160.
162
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The reason is that broad threats imply extensive countermeasures.
However, scholars have yet to develop any agreed or even intellectually
coherent method for deciding which countermeasures are costeffective.166 This has tempted some analysts to simplify the problem by
pruning the threat definition. Within synthetic biology, the Sloan Report
seems to have been the first to pursue this tack:
Over the next five years, the key concern is for synthesis
of a small number of highly pathogenic viruses that are
otherwise difficult to obtain. Ten years from now, it
may be easier to synthesize almost any pathogenic virus
than to obtain it through other means. Eventually, the
synthesis of bacterial pathogens may become possible as
well.167
The danger, of course, is that this approach makes the problem too
manageable. After all, a threat that can be reduced to “a small number of
[known] viruses” implies that predefined lists are feasible.168 If so, the
main strength of human solutions—flexibility in the face of unforeseen
threats—vanishes.
Is this truncation legitimate? Here, everything hinges on the
Report’s judgment that viruses are the only “key concern.”169 Because
the authors do not explain this choice, their reasoning is necessarily
speculative. On the one hand, one can plausibly argue that “a small
number of highly pathogenic viruses” really do pose a greater threat
than other concerns.170 On the other hand, this hardly justifies ignoring
other, assertedly lesser threats. Security scholars have spent the past two
decades warning against genetically engineered threats that range from
inserting a single gene (e.g., to confer vaccine resistance on existing
weapons) to massively reengineering entire genomes (e.g., to confer
virulence on normally benign organisms). Synthetic DNA makes all of
these experiments enormously easier and may put them within the reach
of terrorists. In principle, this risk might be excludable on cost-benefit
grounds. Such a judgment would, however, invite a much more detailed

See, e.g., Thomas Edmunds & Richard Wheeler, Setting Priorities: Assessing Threats and
Identifying Cost-Effective Responses to WMD Terrorism, in WMD TERRORISM: SCIENCE AND
POLICY CHOICES 191–210 (Stephen M. Maurer ed., 2009).
167
GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45, at 13.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id. Smallpox, uniquely among existing biological weapons, could plausibly inflict
hundreds of thousands of casualties. See, e.g., Rutherford & Maurer, supra note 6, at 122−27.
166
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and probably inconclusive debate. On closer examination, then, the
Sloan Report’s truncation is not very satisfying.171
Alas, truncation is not the only problem. In most cases, the literature
fails to mention human screening at all.172 Indeed, some scholars do not
seem to realize that human screening is even an option.173 In hindsight,
there are probably three reasons for this. First, automated solutions are
technological. This makes them fun to think and write about. By
comparison, human screening methods are prosaic and make for
uninteresting reading. Second, most studies conventionally assume that
concrete action will take place five or ten years into the future. This
encourages scholars to stress what automated systems might do in the
future174 instead of asking what human screening can actually do today.
Finally, we have seen some synthetic biologists argue that human
screening is unaffordable. Although this argument is doubtful, no one
seems to have performed a careful analysis before 2009.175
E. Conclusion
The synthetic biology community has invested enormous time and
effort in studying the screening problem. Despite this, most of the
171
This is not really surprising, because any detailed justification would have to invoke
the same kinds of cost-benefit calculus that the Report’s “key concept” rhetoric is supposed
to avoid.
172
The author does not know of a single article or report that focuses on the fundamental
choice between human screening and automated methods prior to 2008. Human screening
was not even mentioned in the exhaustive and widely influential Sloan Report. See
generally GARFINKEL ET AL., supra note 45. Nor did the author mention human screening in
his own report for SB2.0. Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151.
Looking back, the problem may have been that academic security discussions invariably
assumed that screening was a theoretical subject. This overlooked the fact that most
synthetic gene-makers had operated screening programs for years and knew a great deal
about the problem. This only became evident to the author once he began interacting with
Markus Schmidt and other industry executives in early 2008. The fact that many
prominent gene companies, most notably DNA2.0, were lobbying the government for
automated standards deepened the confusion.
173
See, e.g., EUROPEAN GRP., supra note 132, at 44 (“There have been suggestions that
these companies screen all sequences for toxicity or infectivity before processing an order.
That implies that databases of toxic or infective DNA sequences are available.”); NEW &
EMERGING SCI. & TECH., EUROPEAN COMM’N, SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY: APPLYING ENGINEERING
TO BIOLOGY 18 (EUR 21796) (2005) [hereinafter NEST-EUROPEAN COMM’N], available at
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nest/docs/syntheticbiology_b5_eur21796_en.pdf
(last
visited March 25, 2011) (stating that order screening “will require a genomic databank of
potential pathogenic microorganisms and viruses, toxic genes and gene circuits”).
174
The Department of Homeland Security also commissioned Gryphon Scientific’s Rocco
Petrone to write a report surveying industry screening practices. The document has never
been made public.
175
See Maurer et al., supra note 1, at 9–12.
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literature either overlooks or fails to mention the fundamental choice
between human screening and automated solutions. This loss of focus
has, in turn, encouraged scholars and regulators to devote almost all of
their attention to automated solutions that are far less capable than the
human screening methods that most gene-makers already use today.
VIII. TAKING ACTION
By early 2006, most synthetic biologists agreed that artificial genemakers should screen customer orders for potential threat sequences.176
The question was how to put this instinct into practice. In the end, the
community tried three different tracks: government regulation, private
industry standards, and academic self-regulation.177
A. Academic Self-Governance
SB1.0 highlighted security issues and fed expectations that SB2.0
would take concrete action.178 The question remained, however, what
academics could meaningfully do to improve security. Here, the
obvious “Asilomar” model was to lobby the government for regulation.
However, some community members realized that direct action was also
possible. As early as 2003, Professor Drew Endy pointed out that
academics could refuse to do business with gene synthesis houses unless
they “[could] assure us that [they were] not synthesizing known threat
agents.”179 Given the synthetic biology community’s purchasing power
and moral authority, this tactic would exert significant pressure on
companies to screen. In late 2005, the University of California, Berkeley
project began interviewing synthetic biologists to identify still more
ideas that could be implemented by a community-wide vote at SB2.0. In
176
See Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151, at 14 (reporting that
nineteen of the twenty-one synthetic biologists interviewed agreed on the need for
screening).
177
The academic, commercial, and government channels were almost entirely
independent. That said, many leading figures participated in more than one track. For
example, many academic scientists were associated with startup companies while most
large gene-makers participated in both private and government standard setting. The
result was that actors who failed to get their way in one channel could and did try to obtain
different outcomes elsewhere.
178
Church, supra note 43, at 423. But see Futures of Artificial Life, 431 NATURE 613, 613
(2004) (“[T]here is no plan as yet for anything like another Asilomar.”).
179
Endy, supra note 28, at 5. Endy’s group later carried the procedure into practice. See
Editorial, The Peril of Genes for Sale, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 12, 2005, at 5, available at
http://www.precaution.org/lib/05/genes_for_sale.051112.htm (reporting that Endy’s MIT
lab only does business with companies “that operate transparent procedures for screening
gene-synthesis orders for potential bioweapons”).
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the end, the project compiled six resolutions that appeared to be both
feasible and popular:
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

Mandatory Screening. The community could urge gene synthesis
companies to screen according to prevailing best practices.
Community members would stop placing orders with any
company that failed to comply by year’s end.
Improved Screening. The community could work to develop
better screening tools. Members would “review and endorse
these products” when they met the following year for SB 3.0.180
Establishing Norms: Obtaining Advice. The community could
remind members considering experiments of concern of their
obligation to obtain “expert independent advice before
proceeding.” The community would make this advice available
to anyone who needed it.181
Establishing Norms:
Investigating and Reporting Dangerous
Behavior. The community could remind members that they had
“an ethical obligation to investigate and, if necessary, report”
dangerous behavior to authorities.182
Clearinghouses.
Members could establish a “confidential
clearinghouse[] to collect, analyze, and disseminate” experiences
and information about biosecurity risk.183
Technical Solutions. Members could urge funding agencies to
explore technologies for (a) inserting data into DNA identifying
the maker (“watermarking”), and (b) engineering host
organisms that had “little or no chance of surviving” outside the
laboratory (“inherently safe chasses”).184

In early 2006, community members discussed these proposals in two
town hall meetings webcast from Berkeley, California and Cambridge,
Massachusetts.185 The roughly three-dozen attendees voted to debate the
first four resolutions at SB2.0.
This success was short-lived. A few weeks before the conference,
organizers convened a telephone meeting that decided against holding
the scheduled vote after all.186 The reasons for this about-face were never
announced. Conversations with attendees, however, suggest that the
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Maurer et al., From Understanding to Action, supra note 151, app. A at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. app. A at 5
Id.
Id. at 3.
Apart from the two organizers, none of the attendees were synthetic biologists.
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decision was motivated by concerns that SB2.0 had no constitutional
procedure for voting, that a vote might split the community, and that a
vote might invite public controversy.187 This decision was later
reinforced when thirty-five activist groups wrote to conference leaders
demanding that the previously announced vote be canceled.188
Members of the press attending SB2.0 was quick to note what had
happened. For example, New Scientist explained that SB2.0 had rejected
the proposals because they were “controversial” and “too much for
It also suggested that some
synthetic biologists themselves.”189
participants thought that it was too early to act until more research had
been done on screening and other options.190 Similarly, Science remarked
that SB2.0 “only took baby steps toward self-regulation.”191
Organizers softened this disappointment by offering the press an
online Declaration192 in place of the promised vote. This generally
followed the original conference proposals by promising (a) to “support
the organization of an open working group,” (b) to coordinate improved
and freely available software tools for screening, (c) to encourage
companies to adopt “best-practice sequence checking technology,” and
(d) to “encourage individuals and organizations to avoid patronizing
companies that do not systematically check their DNA synthesis

See Stephen M. Maurer & Laurie Zoloth, Synthesizing Biosecurity, BULL. ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 16–18.
188
Backgrounder:
Open Letter on Synthetic Biology, ETC GROUP (May 17, 2006),
http://www.etcgroup.org/en/node/11. There is an urban legend that synthetic biologists
dropped their plans for self-regulation because of this e-mail. See, e.g., de Vriend, supra
note 46, at 65 (“[T]he organizers . . . were sensitive to critical comments of various
participants and the NGO letter. This has most likely contributed to the decision not to
vote on a common statement on the third day of the conference in May 2006.”). In fact, the
decision had already been taken weeks earlier.
189
Peter Aldhous, Synthetic Biologists Reject Controversial Guidelines, NEW SCIENTIST (May
23,
2006),
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn9211-synthetic-biologists-rejectcontroversial-guidelines.html.
190
Id. The article gives a useful cross section of what attendees were thinking:
But in the end, the proposal proved too much for synthetic biologists
themselves. Some argued that it is too early to boycott gene synthesis
firms, as it is not yet clear how best to screen for sequences that might
be used to make a bioweapon. Also, they say, there are currently no
clear channels through which dangerous
experiments could be
reported. The meeting declaration, due to be released later this week,
will instead pledge to help develop software and other tools to
improve companies’ ability to identify orders for potentially
dangerous DNA.
Id.
191
Service, supra note 25, at 1116.
192
See Declaration of the Second International Meeting on Synthetic Biology,
SYNTHETICBIOLOGY.ORG (2006), http://syntheticbiology.org/SB2Declaration.html.
187
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orders.”193 Ironically, the Declaration was never finalized. This,
however, has not stopped scholars from citing it as an authoritative
statement by the community.194 More importantly, it seems to have
encouraged work on improved screening technologies that might not
otherwise have taken place.195
Despite the Declaration, scholars have quite reasonably seen SB2.0’s
self-governance initiative as a “failed attempt.”196 Certainly, synthetic
biologists have tried nothing of the sort since. There are at least three
reasons for this. First, modern academic communities lack any deep
tradition of self-governance.197 Absent Carnegie support, it is doubtful
that SB2.0 would have attempted a vote in the first place. Second, SB2.0
showed members how easily a vote can be derailed. This was bound to
deter future organizers.
Third, the same activists who opposed
governance at SB2.0 were later invited to attend SB3.0 and organize a
session at SB4.0.198 This gave them a much improved platform for
blocking community self-governance in the future.
193
Id. The document also supported further discussions about “challenges to biological
security and biological justice.” Id.
194
See, e.g., ANDREW BALMER & PAUL MARTIN, INST. FOR SCI. & SOC’Y, SYNTHETIC
BIOLOGY: SOCIAL AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES (2008), available at http://www.synbiosafe.
eu/uploads///pdf/synthetic_biology_social_ethical_challenges.pdf; Bügl et al., supra note
162, at 627–29 (announcing collaboration to implement the Declaration); Alexander Kelle,
Synthetic Biology and Biosecurity: From Low Levels of Awareness to a Comprehensive Strategy, 10
EMBO REPS. S23 (2009), available at http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v10/n1s/
pdf/embor2009119.pdf.
195
Kelle, supra note 194. The Declaration promised that “an open working group” would
improve the “existing software tools for screening DNA sequences.” Id. at S25. This was
done although no software was ultimately produced. Perhaps more importantly, the
Declaration kept the screening issue alive. This indirectly contributed to later industry
initiatives. See infra Part VIII.B (discussing the development of industry standards).
196
ERIK PARENS ET AL., WOODROW WILSON INT’L CTR. FOR SCHOLARS, ETHICAL ISSUES IN
SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY:
AN OVERVIEW OF THE DEBATES 12 (2009), available at
http://www.synbioproject.org/process/assets/files/6334/synbio3.pdf. But see Service,
supra note 25, at 1116 (quoting Harvey Rubin as stating that the Declaration was “a good
thing to start with”).
197
Biology’s most widely advertised example of self-governance, the Asilomar
conference, had taken place more than a quarter century before. Furthermore, most of its
self-governance had consisted of petitioning the U.S. government for regulation, although
members did agree to a voluntary interim moratorium on experiments. See, e.g., ORG.
COMM. FOR THE INT’L CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES, SUMMARY
STATEMENT OF THE ASILOMAR CONFERENCE ON RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES 1, 10
(1975), http://profiles.nlm.nih.gov/QQ/B/C/G/D/_/qqbcgd.pdf (recommending safety
measures, describing ongoing “pause in certain aspects of research,” and noting efforts by
national bodies “[i]n many countries” to formulate codes of practice).
198
Strangely, the activists came to see their participation at these conferences as an
achievement in its own right:
Astonishingly ETC Group and friends are on the agenda too. On
Saturday we will be running a panel on the Global Societal Impacts of
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It is hard to know when a process is completely moribund.
Certainly, one can imagine academic self-governance reemerging in, for
example, some future professional society expressly set up for that
purpose. For now, however, no such body is in the works. Indeed,
recent claims that a consensus exists within synthetic biology have been
careful to avoid anything resembling an open vote.199
B. Industry Standards
A few weeks after SB2.0, four big gene synthesis companies—
Geneart, Codon Devices, Blue Heron, and Codagenomics—announced a
new International Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis (“ICPS”)
whose members would “work together to develop technologies that
improve safety and security in synthetic biology.”200 Shortly thereafter,
six ICPS members coauthored an article in Nature Biotechnology along
with four FBI agents, two academics, and two non-ICPS business
executives announcing what they called “a process for developing
effective governance of DNA synthesis technology.”201 What this
process consisted of, exactly, was unclear. Indeed, ICPS was careful to
say that its two main tasks—developing minimum standards for
screening and reporting and conducting future research to improve
software to reduce false positives and handle higher volumes—were
“unresolved issues.”202 By comparison, the article was very explicit
Synthetic Biology along with some civil society colleagues . . . . In
some ways its [sic] a far cry from two years ago when civil society was
turned away from the same Syn Bio confab meeting in California. On
that occasion we had to resort to an open letter to prevent a disastrous
self governance proposal going ahead.
Hanging in Hong Kong with the Syn Bio Crowd, ETCETERA BLOG (Oct. 10, 2008),
http://etcblog.org/2008/10/10/hanging-in-hong-kong-with-the-syn-bio-crowd/.
Ironically, the blogger also complains that “meaningful progress on establishing
accountable oversight of Synthetic Biology has stalled and doesn’t look likely to start
moving again any time soon.” Id. The complaint carefully ignores ETC’s own role in
blocking self-regulation at SB2.0.
199
The trend is particularly apparent in the EU-funded SYNBIOSAFE project, which
conducted extensive interviews and an online conference to find out what synthetic
biologists think. The group then argued that it had found various “consensus” positions
without, however, asking synthetic biologists to endorse them. The supposed consensus
was roundly criticized by audience members at SB4.0.
200
About the ICPS, INT’L CONSORTIUM FOR POLYNUCLEOTIDE SYNTHESIS,
http://polysynth.info/ (last visited June 20, 2007) (on file with author) (stating that ICPS
goals include “work[ing] with governmental organizations to help facilitate the creation of
a governance framework and associated safety protocols to foster an appropriate
regulatory environment for the synthetic biology industry”).
201
Bügl et al., supra note 162, at 627. The four FBI agents participated as coauthors in
their “individual” capacities. Id. at 628.
202
Id. at 629.
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about what the authors did not want. In particular, it insisted that any
eventual screening regime should impose, at most, a “modest cost and
with little or no impact on delivery times.”203 The authors justified this
demand with the familiar argument that regulation would drive gene
synthesis overseas.204
These constraints clearly ruled out human screening. Instead, the
authors predicted a regime in which “companies would use validated
software tools to check synthesis orders against a set of select agents or
sequences to help ensure regulatory compliance and flag synthesis
orders for further review.”205 Companies would pay for this ICPSapproved software through licensing fees.206 In the end, none of this
mattered. In the summer of 2009, ICPS quietly folded without producing
any software.
One might have thought that this was the end of the story. In fact,
industry was just getting started. In April 2008, the International
Association Synthetic Biology (“IASB”), Germany’s leading trade
association, hosted a workshop to discuss practical steps that industry
could take to improve biosecurity.207 Participants publicly promised to
move forward with a slate of specific “work packages” including: (a) a

Id. at 628.
Id. at 628–29. The article also rejected previous suggestions that gene-makers pool
customer order data in a central repository. This was said to be “impractical and
ineffectual” although no reasons were given. Id. at 629.
205
Id. at 627 (caption to Figure 1).
206
Significantly, the authors said nothing about how their scheme would impact
competition. ICPS’s Membership Agreements strongly suggest that the organization
planned to earn substantial license revenues from non-ICPS members. See, e.g., Int’l
Consortium for Polynucleotide Synthesis, Director Membership Agreement (Aug. 13, 2007)
(on file with author) (recognizing that ICPS holds “all right, title, and interest in and to any
and all software and documentation created or developed, and in and to all patentable
inventions conceived or first reduced to practice solely by the Consortium, its employees,
or consultants”). Strangely, U.S. authors have hardly ever analyzed the antitrust
implications of this scheme. For a European perspective, see NEST-EUROPEAN COMM’N,
supra note 173 (arguing that European database laws should be invoked to override
copyright laws that deny access to lists needed to screen) and Anna Deplazes et al., The
Ethics of Synthetic Biology: Outlining the Agenda, in SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, supra note 1, at 5.
207
See HUBERT BERNAUER ET AL., INT’L. ASS’N SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY, TECHNICAL SOLUTIONS
FOR
BIOSECURITY IN SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY (2008), http://www.ia-sb.eu/tasks/
sites/synthetic-biology/assets/File/pdf/iasb_report_biosecurity_syntheticbiology.pdf.
Workshop participants included representatives from Eurofins MWG, Sloning, ATG
Biosynthetics, Febit, Entelechon GmbH, TESSY, Information Services to Life Science,
Geneart, Craic Computing, and Integrated DNA Technologies, Inc. The first seven
companies were IASB members. Id. at 3. Geneart, Craic, and IDT were ICPS members and
initially suggested that ICPS might join in the report. The idea was dropped when ICPS
disbanded later that summer.
203
204
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Code of Conduct specifying responsible screening practices;208 (b) an
online platform that would allow member companies to share threat
data (“VIREP”); (c) a white paper discussing current industry practice
with respect to screening; and (d) a Technical Biosecurity Group to share
information and further develop best practices.209 IASB began work on
all but the last of these initiatives within a few months. By early 2009,
IASB’s Code initiative had been singled out for praise in the pages of
Nature210 and was being actively tracked by actors ranging from the U.S.
State Department to diplomats attending biological weapons talks in
Geneva.
By mid-2009, the draft Code was largely complete. That July, IASB
announced that it would host a meeting in Cambridge, Massachusetts to
finalize the document. So far, so good. In August, however, two big
gene-makers, DNA2.0 and Geneart, hastily assembled a competing
proposal.211 Unlike IASB’s Code, the new proposal was based on using a
predefined list. This made it, as its authors boasted, “fast” and
“cheap.”212
The question, as with all list-based proposals, was
completeness. This judgment, however, could not be made since
DNA2.0’s list was, and is, secret.213 In any case, the proposal did not last
very long. In September, Nature reported that a “standards war” had
broken out between IASB and the Geneart/DNA2.0 coalition.214 DNA2.0
and Geneart stopped mentioning their fast and cheap proposal shortly
afterward.
They did not, however, abandon the standards war. Instead, they
approached three other big U.S. gene-makers to develop a new and, as it
turned out, much stronger standard. Over time, these secret discussions
led to an agreement and self-styled “Consortium.”215 Collectively, this
new group claimed to represent about eighty percent of the industry’s
208
IASB’s Code should not be confused with the codes for governing general
professional behavior described in Part VI. Instead, it was limited to defining a specific
task in detail. It probably would have been more accurate to call IASB’s document a
protocol instead. This usage was eventually taken up by a later competing document in
November 2009. See infra notes 219–21.
209
BERNAUER ET AL., supra note 207, at 16–18.
210
See Editorial, Pathways to Security, 455 NATURE 432, 432 (2008) (praising IASB’s Code
initiative as “laudable”).
211
DNA2.0 Presentation Slides, FBI “Building Bridges Conference,” San Francisco, Cal.
(Aug. 4−5, 2009) (on file with the author).
212
Id.
213
More recently, DNA2.0 has said that a list exists but is secret. May, supra note 49.
214
Erika Check Hayden, Keeping Genes Out of Terrorists’ Hands, NATURENEWS (Aug. 31,
2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/090831/full/461022a.html.
215
DNA2.0 later described the discussions as a “secret pact.” Daniel Grushkin, Synthetic
Bio, Meet “FBIo,” SCIENTIST, May 2010, at 44, available at http://www.thescientist.com/article/display/57355/.
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worldwide installed capacity.216 Unlike the IASB, this new alliance was
closed to all but the largest gene-makers.217 This was done, according to
one member, to maintain a big company “perspective about the scale of
the gene-synthesis industry, which helps us to decide what are
practically implementable decisions.”218 Closed membership also meant
that Consortium members could make decisions without exposing
themselves to criticism from other companies or the public at large.
IASB held its Cambridge meeting as scheduled on November 3,
2009.219 Unlike the Consortium, the proceedings were open. Indeed,
representatives of the U.S. government, the press, and even two
Consortium members, Geneart and Blue Heron, attended.220 Most of the
session was devoted to careful line-by-line revisions of the draft.
Members then finalized the document and took it back to their respective
companies for ratification. By month’s end, eight companies had signed
the document. Significantly, this figure included two Shanghai-based
gene-makers that had not previously been involved in the process.221
At first, Consortium members were non-committal and suggested
that they, too, might join the IASB standard.222 Three weeks later,
however, they announced a competing “Harmonized Protocol”
document. This puzzled many observers because the Protocol—though
couched in entirely new language—mirrored the IASB Code point-forpoint, most notably in its commitment to human screening.223 Creating a
INT’L GENE SYNTHESIS CONSORTIUM, HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL: GENE
SEQUENCE
&
CUSTOMER
SCREENING
TO
PROMOTE
BIOSECURITY
1,
http://www.genesynthesisconsortium.org/Harmonized_Screening_Protocol_files/IGSC%
20Harmonized%20Screening%20Protocol.pdf.
217
Erika Check Hayden, Gene-makers Form Security Coalition, NATURENEWS (Nov. 18
2009), http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091118/full/news.2009.1095.html.
218
Id. (quoting DNA2.0 President Jeremy Minshull).
219
Geneart representatives asked IASB to cancel the vote at the last moment, arguing that
the big companies were working on a standard that the entire industry could use. This
suggestion had essentially no chance of being adopted because Consortium members
refused to let IASB members attend, much less vote at their meetings.
220
Corie Lok, Gene-makers Put Forward Security Standards, NATURENEWS (Nov. 4, 2009),
http://www.nature.com/news/2009/091104/full/news.2009.1065.html.
221
Code of Conduct for Best Practices in Gene Synthesis, INT’L ASS’N SYNTHETIC BIOLOGY,
http://www.ia-sb.eu/go/synthetic-biology/activities/press-area/press-information/code
-of-conduct-for-best-practices-in-gene-synthesis/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2011). Probably the
most important compromise was to limit human screening to matches drawn from bacteria
and viruses. This was based on a judgment that current technology could not make
weapons from other organisms in any case. The compromise allowed computers to
prescreen ninety-nine percent of all orders automatically. The compromise was proposed
by the U.S.-based Synthetic Biology Industry Association, which later endorsed the Code.
222
Lok, supra note 220.
223
IGSC promised to use “automated screening as a filter to identify pathogen and toxin
DNA sequences.” HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL, supra note 216, at 2. All of these
216
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parallel standard did, however, let Consortium members avoid open
meetings and power-sharing with IASB.224 This was important because
Consortium members had explicitly retained the right to change the
Protocol in the future.225
Even so, the Consortium’s decision to create a redundant standard
was only a detail. Between the Code and Protocol, more than eighty
percent of all gene-makers had now endorsed human screening. This, in
turn, put even more pressure on the industry’s remaining hold-outs to
adopt one standard or the other. At this point, it was reasonable to think
that the dominoes would continue falling until the entire industry had
adopted human screening.
It was not to be. On November 28th, the U.S. government issued
draft guidelines for screening. Unlike the two private standards, this
official document suggested that a predefined list might be good enough
after all. Not surprisingly, commercial gene-makers reacted to this
announcement by adopting a wait-and-see attitude. No new companies
have joined the Code or Protocol since then.
C. Government Regulation
The U.S. government’s draft guidelines had been a long time
coming. Five years earlier, the National Research Council’s Fink
Committee had called for a new body that could advise the federal
government on the need for regulation. The Bush Administration duly
created the National Scientific Advisory Committee for Synthetic Biology
(“NSABB”) in 2005. One of the Committee’s first projects was to write a
report urging the U.S. government to develop a process that private
synthetic gene companies could use to screen incoming orders.226
Strikingly, the report stressed that these standards should address all
threat sequences whether or not they were associated with Select
Agents.227 Beyond this, however, the report said almost nothing about
would then be reviewed by “a human expert.” Id. IASB members had similarly agreed to
permit an automated prescreen several weeks earlier.
See supra note 208 and
accompanying text.
224
The depth of this feeling is reflected in Consortium members’ consistent refusal to
mention IASB and its Code of Conduct in any article or public talk. This is more than a
little strange, because the Consortium Protocol was clearly drafted in response to IASB’s
Code. Consortium members’ silence has caused endless confusion by leading casual
observers and some journalists to conflate the Consortium Protocol with the IASB’s Code.
225
HARMONIZED SCREENING PROTOCOL, supra note 216, at 4.
226
See NSABB, ADDRESSING BIOSECURITY, supra note 147, at 8. Gene-makers who failed to
adopt the standards would be barred from doing business with federal grantees or
contractors. Id. at 11.
227
See id. (providing that federal regulations should apply to all threat pathogens
whether “Select Agents or otherwise”). NSABB also called on government agencies to

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol45/iss4/4

Maurer: End of the Beginning or Beginning of the End? Synthetic Biology's

2011]

Synthetic Biology’s Stalled Security Agenda

1435

what the federal regulations would look like. Worse, it failed to mention
the fundamental choice between human screening and automated
solutions.228
In March 2007, the U.S. government convened an interagency Task
Force under HHS’s leadership to develop formal regulations.229 In
retrospect, this stacked the deck against strong regulation. Indeed, HHS
later admitted that any regulation “much more onerous than what
providers are currently doing . . . might be of some concern.”230 This
position was peculiar, to say the least. After all, the normal assumption
is that regulation is necessary because industry has done too little. Here,
however, HHS was deliberately treating current industry efforts as a
ceiling for regulation. This implied that government regulation could at
most harmonize, not raise, the existing level of effort.
The fact that human screening was a practical option should have
been obvious, at the latest, when IASB issued its first draft Code of
Conduct in September 2008. In practice, however, HHS paid little or no
attention to private standards until DNA2.0 and Geneart announced
their fast and cheap alternative in August 2009.231 Even then, federal
officials praised both sides without addressing the fundamental choice
between human screening and automated methods.
As already discussed, the great majority of gene synthesis companies
embraced human screening standards in November 2009. By then,
however, the federal government had invented a very different
approach. HHS published this “Best Match” standard on November 27,
2009.232 It required companies to investigate gene sequences if, and only
if, they were closer to genes associated with Select Agents than to any
other organism found in Genbank.233 The great advantage of Best Match
was, of course, that it could be readily automated. At the same time,
HHS knew that the Select Agent list did not begin to cover the spectrum

“develop and promote standards and preferred practices for screening orders and
interpreting the results, and require that orders be screened by providers.” Id.
228
To the contrary, the report seemed to endorse automated solutions by urging the
government to develop standards for “determining the sequences for which to screen.” Id.
This was, at the very least, a revealing slip of the pen.
229
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., SCREENING FRAMEWORK GUIDANCE FOR PROVIDERS
OF SYNTHETIC DOUBLE-STRANDED DNA 1 (2010) [hereinafter HHS, SCREENING
FRAMEWORK], available at http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/
Documents/syndna-guidance.pdf.
230
Wadman, supra note 55 (quoting Jessica Tucker).
231
The Task Force was briefed on IASB’s activities as early as September 2008.
232
See Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,319, 62,319–27 (Nov. 27, 2009) (discussing the Best Match standard).
233
Id. at 62,323.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 4 [2011], Art. 4

1436 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

of possible threats and that Best Match had no chance of detecting
them.234 Only human screeners could do that.
D. Harmonizing Outcomes
HHS did not finalize its Guidelines for nearly a year. During that
time, several scholars published articles complaining that Best Match did
nothing to detect threats beyond the Select Agent list and was less
capable than the private standards that industry had already adopted.235
Formally, HHS could easily have closed this gap by adding a human
screening requirement to Best Match. It did not. HHS did, however,
revise the Guidelines in important ways. The original draft had claimed
to implement the broad principle that “[p]roviders should know if the
nature and identity of the product that they are selling poses a hazard to
public health, agriculture, or security.”236 This implied that companies
could meet all of their biosecurity obligations by adopting Best Match.
The final Guidelines, by comparison, were limited to the much narrower
principle that “[p]roviders should know if the product that they are
synthesizing and distributing contains . . . a ‘sequence of concern.’”237
While HHS admitted that non-Select Agents also posed a biosecurity
threat,238 the final Guidelines said nothing about how to screen for them
The clearest admission is found in the final Guidelines:
The U.S. Government recognizes that there are concerns that synthetic
dsDNA sequences not unique to the Select Agents or Toxins or CCL
items may also pose a biosecurity concern. . . . However, due to the
complexity of determining pathogenicity and because research in this
area is ongoing and many such agents are not currently encompassed
by regulations in the U.S., generating a comprehensive list of such
agents to screen against is not currently feasible and hence is not
provided in this Guidance.
HHS, SCREENING FRAMEWORK, supra note 229, at 9.
235
See, e.g., Markus Fischer & Stephen M. Maurer, Harmonizing Biosecurity Oversight for
Gene Synthesis, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 20 (2010); Jonathan B. Tucker, Double-Edged
DNA: Preventing the Misuse of Gene Synthesis, ISSUES SCI. & TECH., Spring 2010, at 23,
available at http://www.issues.org/26.3/tucker.html; Malcolm Dando, Synthetic Biology:
Harbinger of an Uncertain Future?, BULL. ATOMIC SCIENTISTS (Aug. 16, 2010),
http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/columnists/malcolm-dando/synthetic-biologyharbinger-of-uncertain-future.
236
Screening Framework Guidance for Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA Providers, 74
Fed. Reg. at 62,320.
237
HHS, SCREENING FRAMEWORK, supra note 229, at 3.
238
Id. at 9. HHS admitted in the accompanying FAQs that “it is not possible at this time
to provide a robust database that would identify all or even most dangerous sequences.”
U.S. Dep’t Health & Human Servs., Frequently Asked Questions: Screening Framework
Guidance for Providers of Synthetic Double-Stranded DNA, PUB. HEALTH EMERGENCY,
http://www.phe.gov/Preparedness/legal/guidance/syndna/Documents/synbio-faq.pdf
(last visited Apr. 11, 2011) [hereinafter HHS, Frequently Asked Questions].
234
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apart from urging industry to address the issue.239 Each firm would
have to decide for itself which, if any, additional steps were needed to
operate responsibly.
Why did HHS limit itself to Select Agent threats? Superficially, the
answer was that “generating a comprehensive list of [other threats] to
screen against is not currently feasible and hence is not provided in this
Guidance.”240 But this answer only made sense if human screening was
somehow undesirable. Here, HHS offered several arguments.241 First, it
pointed out that human screening involved examining similar gene
sequences and that this implied a “cut-off” beyond which matches
would not be examined.242 This criterion, HHS argued, “would be
arbitrary.”243 In fact, though, biologists had been using cutoffs for years.
It would have been straightforward to incorporate one of these into the
Guidelines.
Second, HHS argued that it wanted a standard that was “feasible for
small and large providers, as well as international providers.”244 But this
argument was also doubtful. After all, most of the industry―including
companies of every size―had already agreed to adopt human screening.
This plainly implied that human screening was “feasible.”
Finally, HHS argued that Best Match offered “consistency, because a
hit for one company should register as a hit for other companies
adhering to the guidance.”245 This last argument was probably the most
plausible. At the same time, it represented a distinct policy choice. HHS
clearly had the power to issue standards that required human
discretion.246 By refusing to do so, the agency had elevated a subsidiary
goal―that threat judgments should be replicable―over security itself.

See id. (remarking that “many providers have already instituted measures to address
these concerns” and that “ongoing development of best practices in this area is
commendable and encouraged”).
240
HHS, SCREENING FRAMEWORK, supra note 229, at 9.
241
The FAQs refer to human screening methods as “Top Homology.” HHS, Frequently
Asked Questions, supra note 238.
242
Id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
245
Id.; see also Heidi Ledford, Gene-Synthesis Rules Favour Convenience, 467 NATURE 898,
898 (2010) (stating that officials believed that “human screens could lead to inconsistencies
between companies,” whereas Best Match would “ensure a consistent baseline that can be
uniformly applied across industry” (quoting Theresa Lawrence)).
246
See Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U.S. 337, 343 (1952) (affirming
regulations incorporating the exercise of human discretion).
239
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E. Conclusion
It would have been both logical and easy for HHS to endorse the
human screening standards developed by IASB and the Consortium.
The fact that it refused to do so strongly suggests that it had (and
presumably still has) little or no appetite for regulation.
IX. THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE
Synthetic biology is now almost a year into its second decade. At
least formally, HHS’s work is not done. First, it admits that the
Guidelines are incomplete. This suggests that they will eventually need
to be modified. Second, and more immediately, NSABB has called on
the agency to develop review procedures for experiments of concern.
HHS is not likely to ignore this commitment. On the other hand, these
future regulations―like Best Match itself―could well be anemic. This
Section asks how much life is left in synthetic biology’s security agenda.
A. The Future of Private Standards
The final HHS Guidelines leave industry responsible for deciding
what procedures, if any, should be adopted to guard against threats
beyond the Select Agents list. Superficially, at least, the IASB’s Code of
Conduct and the Consortium’s Protocol should remain in force. At the
same time, the current situation is unstable. If one or two companies
decide to revise or abandon their commitments, price competition could
quickly force the rest to follow suit.
As this Article goes to press, the tea leaves are hard to read. On the
one hand, DNA2.0 has suggested that it will use a list-based approach,
On the other,
even though, absurdly, its list remains secret.247
Consortium member IDT has publicly reaffirmed its commitment to
human screening, promising that “[t]here’s never a case where we would
have a gene go right into production without a human being having
looked at both the sequence and the prospective customer.”248 Finally,
outside commentators have said that the Guidelines are less a definitive

May, supra note 49.
Michael Eisenstein, Synthetic DNA Firms Embrace Hazardous Agents Guidance But
Remain Wary of Automated ‘Best Match’, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1225, 1226 (2010)
(quoting Robert Dawson, a director at Integrated DNA Technologies). IASB member
Entelechon similarly reaffirmed that employees would continue to examine the “complete
lists of hits” and not just those flagged by computers. Id. at 1225 (quoting Markus Fischer).
Markus Fischer, the director and cofounder of Entelechon, further stated that “[a] fully
automated screening system leaves significant biosecurity questions unanswered.” Id.
247
248
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solution than “something to be improved over time.”249
Such
expectations will make it harder for companies that have endorsed the
Code or Protocol to change their minds.
B. More Studies Are Needed?
Pressure for reform depends on the public’s attention span. This will
inevitably fall off if scholars stop writing articles and reports. Ideally,
these new publications should also advance the literature. Here, the
evidence is mixed. On the one hand, some recent articles do little more
than promise to conduct additional research in the future.250 On the
other, most authors seem content with the basic threat analysis and
response framework that synthetic biologists developed between 2006
and 2008.251 This provides at least some hope that new work will build
on what has come previously. Urgent topics include (a) deepening our
empirical understanding of existing industry screening programs;
(b) exploring the fundamental security trade-off between human
screening and other methods; and (c) carefully testing the economic
assertion that human screening is unsustainable. The problem, for now,
is that researchers seem to have moved on to other topics, for example,
synthetic biology’s impact on “notions of life and the blurring of the line
between natural and artificial.”252 Alternatively, many European and

Id. at 1226 (quoting MITRE researcher James Diggans).
BALMER & MARTIN, supra note 194, at 5 (“This will require a thorough review of
existing controls and regulations, and the development of new measures, particularly
relating to biosafety, environmental release and biosecurity.”); Markus Schmidt et al., A
Priority Paper for the Societal and Ethical Aspects of Synthetic Biology, 3 SYST. & SYNTHETIC
BIOLOGY 3, 5 (2009), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/
PMC2759426/pdf/11693_2009_Article_9034.pdf (advocating “cooperation of DNA
synthesis companies” and “further developing and improving the technical means (e.g.
software, databases) used to screen for DNA orders,” and noting that “a balance will need
to be struck between security gains on one hand and practicability and usefulness on the
other”).
251
The Center for American Progress has, however, argued that new reports are needed.
Denise Caruso, Synthetic Biology: An Overview and Recommendations for Anticipating and
Addressing Emerging Risks, SCI. PROGRESS (Nov. 12, 2008), http://www.science
progress.org/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/syntheticbiology.pdf. The argument is based
on the claim that “[v]irtually all the reports on synthetic biology have come from the
synthetic biology community or from a proponent’s or an opponent’s point of view.” Id. at
9. This premise seems debatable, except in the usual sense that all reports, including the
Center’s, are tinged by their authors’ preconceptions. The Center’s case would be stronger
if it could point to instances in which the existing literature had overlooked specific issues
or evidence. Indeed, this is how academic discourse is supposed to work. But the Center
report only complains of unspecified “serious logical flaws and omissions of fact.” Id.
252
IDEA League Summerschool, Synthetics: The Ethics of Synthetic Biology 4 (Aug. 2007),
http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/images/uploads/Ethics_of_synthetic_biology.pdf.
249
250
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also developing world scholars have begun developing self-consciously
regional viewpoints about synthetic biology.253 So far, at least, their
insights do not seem much different from American ones.254
C. The Presidential Commission
Further action ultimately depends on public impatience. However,
recent events suggest a concerted effort to convince the public that
biosecurity is a solved problem. In late 2009, President Obama created a
new Presidential Commission to evaluate bioethics.255 Not surprisingly,
one of the Commission’s first orders of business was to address synthetic
biology.256 This, however, presented an obvious problem. Unlike earlier
panels, the Commission could not simply recommend future action.
After all, HHS had already drafted Guidelines. Admitting that this
document was incomplete would commit the United States to yet
another round of regulation and keep the larger security debate
simmering for years.
The Commission worked hard to avoid this result. In September
2010, it held a seventy-five minute hearing on synthetic biology security
policy.257 This consisted almost entirely of prepared remarks by the
chairman of NSABB’s synthetic biology working group and two
executives representing Consortium members.258 Readers who have
come this far would have found their presentations remarkable. Indeed,
none of the speakers so much as mentioned IASB, the tumultuous
standards war over human screening, or the fact that one of the
represented companies, Geneart, had recently pressed for a fast and
cheap automated solution. Not surprisingly, the two industry panelists
For other recent ethics-oriented projects and reports, see EUROPEAN GRP., supra note 132,
and PARENS ET AL., supra note 196.
253
See Aim, ORG. FOR INT’L DIALOGUE & CONFLICT MGMT., http://www.idialog.eu/
fwf/Aim.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) (reporting new project to investigate synthetic
biology risks in Austria and China).
254
Some reports claim that security is a lower priority outside the United States. So far,
however, there have been few if any concrete suggestions about how this preference
should translate into policy. More fundamentally, we have seen that European genemakers took the lead in setting private screening standards. This suggests that the usual
transatlantic stereotype is badly oversimplified.
255
Exec. Order No. 13,521, 3 C.F.R. 279 (2009), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. § 6601
(Supp. III 2010).
256
Id.
257
The session was part of a much broader, two-day set of hearings devoted to synthetic
biology.
258
2010 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13. The event, which was organized by HHS
staffers, did not include a single panelist who had criticized the agency’s Best Match
proposal or endorsed IASB’s Code of Conduct.
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also went out of their way to praise HHS’s Guidelines without once
mentioning Best Match’s deficiencies.259
Based on this narrative, the Commission promptly produced a 180page report.260 Essentially, its goal is to declare victory and go home.
“[S]cientists both in and outside government,” the Commission argued,
have already (a) achieved “a shared culture of responsibility to assure
safe conduct of research in the largely uncharted world of genetic
engineering,”261 and (b) developed “practical mechanisms” to implement
security.262 Furthermore, these oversight mechanisms and bodies were
“well situated and in the process of reviewing and monitoring the field
“At this time,” the
of synthetic biology as it develop[ed].”263
Commission concluded, “the risks posed by synthetic biology activities
in both settings appear to be appropriately managed.”264 Conversely, the
Commission sees “no need at this time to create additional agencies or
oversight bodies focused specifically on synthetic biology.”265
Still, one awkward loose end remained. No one doubted that HHS’s
Best Match algorithm could only detect threats on the Select Agent list.
Yet, NSABB’s 2006 report and HHS’s Guidelines had both admitted that
other threats existed. This implied that synthetic biologists had not
solved their biosecurity problem after all. Here, the Commission
resorted to the familiar tactic of dialing down the threat. Now,
retroactively, it argued that NSABB’s 2006 report had been “focused on
synthesis of select agents and toxins.”266 Furthermore, proposals to
control access to non-Select Agent sequences had been “[n]oticeably
absent” from NSABB’s 2010 report.267 This omission, the Commission
259
The slanted presentation was completely predictable. Consortium members seldom if
ever mention IASB or its Code in any public forum, press release, published article, or
interview unless compelled to do so. This sometimes requires them to rewrite matters of
public record. For example, DNA2.0 executive Claes Gustaffson has argued that the idea of
private security code originated in a “secret pact” by Consortium members in August 2009.
Grushkin, supra note 215. This is plainly inconsistent with IASB’s widely publicized efforts
to create a standard from April 2008 forward. See supra Part I (discussing these efforts).
260
See 2010 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 13.
261
Id. at 144.
262
Id. at 146.
263
Id. at 124.
264
Id. at 147. The Commission did recognize that non-biologist academics and, especially
hobbyists, “may not be familiar with the standards for ethics and responsible stewardship
that are commonplace for those working in biomedical research.” Id. at 134. It therefore
urged government to “educate and inform” these groups. Id. Even here, however, the
Commission was careful to add that this was “not a call for specific restraints upon the
[hobbyist] community at this time.” Id. at 147.
265
Id. at 8.
266
Id. at 73.
267
Id.
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insisted, appeared to reflect a deliberate policy judgment that non-Select
Agent “sequences alone [would] not yield, nor often be sufficient to
predict, functions.”268 On its face, this elliptical statement seemed to
imply that screening non-Select Agents was impossible. This, however,
was clearly a straw man. After all, neither the IASB Code nor the
Consortium Protocol had ever called for examining “sequences alone.”
Instead, current best practice called for human screeners to compare
incoming orders against known sequences whose functions were listed
in Genbank. The Commission failed to explain why HHS had rejected
this method, nor did it criticize the agency for publishing guidelines that
were significantly weaker than the industry’s own standards.
D. Conclusion
Synthetic biology’s first decade was marked by interminable debates
coupled with promises of future action. The Commission broke sharply
with this pattern by arguing that existing steps had already solved the
problem.
X. THE ROAD BACK
At this point, many readers will conclude that the U.S. federal
government has no appetite for biosecurity. However, we have seen that
rank-and-file synthetic biologists have often pursued reforms without
waiting for official action. This Part asks what community members can
still do to bring synthetic biology’s security agenda back from the brink.
A. Screening
Industry’s commitment to the Code and Protocol remains fragile.
The trick will be to bring prompt, public criticism to bear on any
company that downgrades its standards.
The standard that prevails will, in turn, determine the future of
screening. Automated systems based on lists are, by definition, static.
Because the whole point is to avoid human screening, companies have
little opportunity or incentive to find new threats. This suggests that
lists will evolve slowly, if at all. By comparison, human screening forces
companies to examine each and every order that comes in the door. This
is expensive and creates powerful incentives for gene-makers to save and
reuse screeners’ work.269 This should lead to increasingly complete
Id.
Strong databases mean that screeners only need to examine a particular Genbank
sequence once. The resulting savings are substantial. Indeed, companies currently
268
269
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threat lists over time. Moreover, these savings will be even larger if
companies agree to pool their data. IASB and the University of
California, Berkeley project recently created pilot scale software
(“VIREP”) to help gene-makers do this. Here, the ultimate goal is to
produce a joint-threat database in much the same way that companies
currently work together to write Apache and other open source software
programs.270
Even if human screening survives, there will still be much to do. As
long as the Consortium’s meetings and membership are closed, no one
can be sure how rigorously the Protocol is being implemented. Worse,
gene-makers have an obvious incentive to decide close questions in favor
of filling orders. VIREP-style sharing limits this tendency by ensuring
that every threat judgment is open to scrutiny and, if necessary, criticism.
More generally, the existence of a parallel Code and Protocol can only
promote mischief. The synthetic biology community should demand
that IASB and the Consortium merge their standards. Thereafter, any
amendments to the merged standard should be (a) voted on by all active
gene-makers regardless of size, and (b) conducted in meetings open to
both public and press.
B. Experiments of Concern and Education
Given NSABB’s recommendation, HHS is overwhelmingly likely to
develop a review system for experiments of concern. The only real
question is whether the new regulations will do any good. Here, the
main uncertainties are (a) whether scientists contemplating experiments
of concern will actually request reviews, and (b) whether the new review
bodies will be more than a rubber stamp. With respect to the first
question, much will depend on journal editors. If editors reliably refuse
to publish experiments performed without advance review, few if any
authors will skirt the system. Deterrence will only work, however, if
editors withhold forgiveness. For this reason, the system’s ultimate
integrity will depend on whether government officials and academic
leaders are willing to criticize editors who publish un-reviewed work.
The second question is more searching. No amount of detailed
regulation can keep friendly review bodies from rubber-stamping

estimate that they have seen up to five percent of all sequences before. Maurer et al., supra
note 1, at 24.
270
The business case for sharing threat data is identical to the logic behind Apache and
other open source collaborations. Because companies do not compete for customers on the
basis of who has the best threat database, they have no reason to hoard data. At the same
time, shared data cuts each company’s costs.
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results.271 Ultimately, the quality of review will have to rest on the
reviewers’ own professionalism. This can, however, be bolstered by
insisting that reviewers write detailed opinions explaining why each
experiment should or should not go forward. Furthermore, these
opinions should be available for public inspection, either immediately or
following some brief interval.272 With luck, exposing opinions to critics
will do more than keep reviewers honest. It will also lead to new and
better policies. Public opinions will allow scholars to collect, criticize,
and (with luck) harmonize reviewers’ instincts.
C. Broader Lessons: U.S. Government Policy
The most striking lesson from synthetic biology’s first decade is that
traditional government regulation is not the only way to accomplish
security. Indeed, in a world of shrinking American power it may not
even be the most effective way. We have seen that the commercial and
arguably also the academic communities are capable of self-governance.
Indeed, their standards, contrary to expectations,273 are often more
stringent than the government’s.274
The Best Match debacle is, in large measure, the story of what
happens when government ignores private standards. Reform must
begin, therefore, by making sure that officials pay more attention next
time.275 The federal government can do this by developing formal
guidelines to help agencies decide what to do and say when commercial
271
This will be especially true if, as it seems likely, most experiments of concern turn out
to be harmless.
272
The claim is sometimes made that publishing reviews will disclose valuable research
ideas to the researchers’ competitors. But this will not matter if competitors know that the
researcher has an insurmountable head start. Embargoing reviews for one year should
almost always be sufficient.
273
The editors of Nature had confidently predicted that private standards would
inevitably be weaker than public ones. Pathways to Security, supra note 210, at 432.
274
This observation raises interesting political economy questions. Political theory
suggests that government agencies tend to be strongly influenced by narrow and often
extreme interests. This probably explains why HHS chose a more lenient standard than the
industry itself. Standards wars, on the other hand, are rough and tumble affairs that
produce winning standards almost at random. On average, at least, one would expect
these views to be relatively mainstream. Stephen M. Maurer, Beyond Treaties and Regulation:
Using Market Forces to Control Dual Use Technologies 12 (Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Goldman
Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. GSPP10-010, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1705630.
275
Official indifference has been a recurring obstacle for private entrepreneurs trying to
organize for a public purpose. For additional examples, see Stephen M. Maurer, Five Easy
Pieces: Case Studies of Entrepreneurs Who Organized Private Communities for a Public Purpose
(Univ. of Cal., Berkeley, Goldman Sch. of Pub. Policy, Working Paper No. GSPP10-011,
2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713329.
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or academic standards overlap their mission.276 This kind of guidance
would admittedly have to address deep issues. When are private
standards economically feasible or likely to be more effective than formal
regulation or treaty? When should government encourage existing
private standards initiatives or instigate new ones?277 When should the
government intervene in private standards wars by, for example,
praising one side or the other?278 And how should the government
shape its own regulations so that they build on, rather than ignore or
dismantle, what the private sector has done?
At the same time, it is probably more important to ask these
questions than answer them. Just recognizing that government has an
obligation to engage with commercial and academic standards will be an
enormous step forward.
XI. CONCLUSION: EXPECTING MORE
This Article has described the first ten years of synthetic biology’s
security agenda, its collapse in 2009−2010, and the prospects for reviving
it. Many readers will find this picture discouraging. They shouldn’t.
Most law review articles, after all, end by proposing schemes that have
no chance at all of being implemented. By comparison, the idea that the
federal government will one day enact, say, human screening seems
eminently feasible.
For the past decade, synthetic biology scholars have almost always
assumed that the time for taking action was five or ten years distant.
Things are different now that government has tried to act and failed. Of
course, we can still hope that future government regulations will work
better. But that seems unreasonable. HHS’s stubborn defense of its
Convening a National Research Council committee would be a good first step.
This will inevitably include addressing activists’ claims that self-governance allows
scientists “to act as judge and jury.” Service, supra note 25, at 1116 (quoting activist Sue
Mayer). This argument is far from self-evident, because it assumes a false choice between
self-governance and traditional government regulation. In fact, self-governance “does not
preclude other forms of governance, any more than the possession of conscience makes
redundant the strictures of law.” Policing Ourselves, 441 NATURE 383, 383 (2006). More
precisely, the activists’ argument requires the additional assumption that self-regulation
changes outcomes by creating “a public image of scientific responsibility . . . that
delay[s] . . . appropriate government regulation.” Synthetic Biology—Global Societal Review
Urgent!, ETCGROUP 3–4, http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/11/01/synbiolet
bckgroundfinal.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). Even then, it is hard to see why
communities should not have the same right to make ethical judgments that individuals
do.
278
Similar government jawboning of private companies is already familiar when it comes
to the domestic economy. For a classic account, see GRANT MCCONNELL, STEEL AND THE
PRESIDENCY, 1962 (1963).
276
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hapless-but-cheap Best Match standard is no accident. “[E]ven a dog,”
as Justice Holmes tells us, “distinguishes between being stumbled over
and being kicked.”279
Synthetic biology’s security agenda has reached a critical moment.
On the one hand, the Presidential Commission has told the country that
synthetic biology has a functioning “culture of responsibility,” is
adequately managing its risks, and does not need to revisit Best Match.
On the other, very little of this can be squared with mainstream scholars’
persistent warnings that biological warfare threats are real and deserve
be taken seriously. The question now is whether anyone will notice.
Much depends on the scholars themselves. If they speak out,
synthetic biology’s security agenda may yet come back stronger than
ever.
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